Fr. David Bissias' Transformations

Dating Christmas

2011-12-15T17:05:00.000-06:00

For all those who still have questions:

1. All Orthodox Christians observe the Feast of the Nativity of our Lord on December 25. It just so happens that there are two different calendars in use by Orthodox Christians in the world. In fact, most Orthodox Christian in the world still use the Julian calendar (Old Calendar) for ecclesiastical observances, and this calendar is currently thirteen (13) days behind the Gregorian calendar, a calendar is use by virtually all civil governments and the United Nations. Thus, December 25 on the Old/Julian Calendar currently falls on everyone else's December 7. And to be clear, as time goes on, the discrepancy between the Julian and Gregorian calendars will continnue to grow to fourteen days, then fifteen, and so on.

2. The dating of the feast itself--why the Church observes December 25 for the birth of Jesus Christ--is more complicated and historically uncertain. There are a number of considerations.
     a.) The date is completely non-biblical. None of the New Testament writings refer to a specific date. The closest we come is a range of possible years as noted in the Gospel of Luke who mentions the current Roman Emperor and the governor of the Roman province of Syria. One might include as well the reign of King Herod the Great who died in 4 B.C. However, no specific day is provided. The best guess for the year is what we now refer to as around 4 B.C., but other years are possible as well between about 6 B.C. and 4 B.C. The fact that this range falls technically B.C. (Before Christ) is irrelevant, since it is well known that when our current numbering of years was adopted, errors were made.
     b.) Scholars are divided at what time of year Jesus was born. Some would note that if it occurred during a census of the Roman province of Judea, it could not occur in the winter when travel would be difficult. Others note that it could not occur during any harvest or planting season, since agriculturists would be unable to travel. In the end, there are good arguments against any month or specific date.
     c.) The festal celebration of the Lord's Nativity was known by the third century, but probably did not develop long before that. Initially, different dates were observed in different places. But as with Pascha, there has always been a tendency for observances in the Church to become uniform.
     d.) The fact that December 25 was a civic/pagan holiday at Rome is probably significant to some degree. It was the day of Sol Invictus, the "Invincible Sun." This may account for much of the hymnology of the Nativity being tied to the "Sun of Righteousness [or Justice]." Still, there were probably other factors since we known that in the West December 25 was an early date that many celebrated, while in the East January 6 was for long the preferred date.
     e.) Both December 25 and January 6 seem to have been picked due to traditions about the date of Jesus' death. In the East, the traditional date of Christ's death was Friday, April 6. In the West, the tradition was that Jesus died on Friday, March 25 (both dates were possible for a Jewish Passover in the 30s). Now the significance of these dates of Jesus' death is that in the ancient world, a "perfect life" was thought to be comprised of complete, full years from conception to death. Thus, if Jesus died on a given date, he probably was conceived on that date as well. If he was conceived on April 6, a "perfect" nine-month pregnancy (as it was then thought) would result in birth on January 6. If on March 25, then the birthdate would be December 25.
     f.) In the end, a compromise of these traditions seems to have occurred. The combined celebration of the Lord's birth and baptism (Theophany--the "Appearance" or "Manifestation" of God) on January 6 was separated, and the birth of the Savior celebrated on December 25 with the baptism remaining on January 6. At Rome, January 6 was observed as the Theophany, (including the veneration of the Magi but not the birth of Christ). St John Chrysostom seems to have changed the date at Antioch at the beginning of the 5th century, and eventually succeeded in establishing the December 25 observance at Constantinople when he became Archbishop/Patriarch of the Imperial City. It seems that St Gregory the Theologian (also known as Nazianzus) was earlier unsuccessful when he tried to set the date at Constantinople as December 25 to conform with Roman and Alexandrian practice (381 A.D.).
     g.) In the end, the December 25 date took hold even in the East. Eventually, soon after but before the 7th century, March 25 became the celebration of the Lord's conception by the Virgin Mary and the Holy Spirit (Annunciation).
     h.) Finally, the fact that both December and January fall within deep winter probably added to the desire to celebrate the Lord's Nativity on these dates rather than any other (rather arbitrary) date of the year since the symbolism of the rising (and after the Winter Solstice) increasing Sun was thought to relate to prophetic texts of the Old Testament, and the fact that the world's "greenery" is generally "dead." Even to this day, the service books of the feast refer to the Nativity as the "Winter Pascha," and its connection to the Lord's Passion should not go unnoticed. It is for this reason the Lord was born into our fallen, mortal world!

Merry Christmas!

So this is Christmas, 2011

2011-12-04T00:19:00.000-06:00

I know of a supposedly Orthodox Christian parish in the United States where the annual Church School Christmas Pageant is likely to be canceled because, in 2011, Christmas will fall on a Sunday. Because of this bizarre and unusual coincidence of the Feast of the Nativity and Sunday, apparently the supposedly Orthodox Christian parents do not believe that bringing their children to Church on the Feast of the Nativity is important, much less vital. If it were just Sunday, perhaps attending services on the Lord's Day would be okay, but apparently the pastor of that parish is foolish to believe that children should attend Church on a Sunday when it coincides with Christmas. That, apparently, is not what Christmas is all about!

Anecdotally, from my fellow clergy, I hear that in fact, the majority of parishioners of Orthodox Churches will not be in attendance on Christmas, though this has little to do with it falling this year on a Sunday; this is typical of every year. Perhaps this year the beginning of the shortened season of the NBA is more important--with a special triple-header broadcast...not to mention football, christmas presents, food.

What I don't understand is how we (because WE are all in this together as Church) got to this point where just about anything else is more important than the privilege of assembling in the name of the Lord within the Kingdom.

And yes, I bet the pastor of that Orthodox Christian parish in the UNited States where the Church School Christmas Pageant was canceled could have scheduled it for the Sunday prior to Christmas. Perhaps he thought that the actual day of Christmas was likely to be the more important day for a Christmas celebration. But then again, maybe these supposedly Orthodox Christian parents have a point: it might snow on Christmas, making travel difficult; someone might get sick from the festivities and dinners of Christmas eve, being unable to attend on the morning of the Nativity...and perhaps other possibilities that would be good arguments to not wait until Christmas for the Christmas pageant. So I would suggest to that pastor that he should go one step farther: schedule it in 2012 for May 20. Why put it off until Christmas?

Politics and Cult

2011-10-12T23:00:00.000-05:00

Again this year, as in 2007-8, the Republican Presidential Primary race has raised the issue of religion among its candidates--actually one in particular. Before addressing the specific point relevant to that primary race, it may be noted that religion should be a relevant point for voters, at least to some degree.

This is because the faith of any candidate does reflect, in principle, both aspects of their character and, to some degree, their way of thinking. Also in principle, voters in the American democratic system should consider character a valid criterion for elected officials if only because one would probably not vote for someone whose character exhibits demonstrable dishonesty.

Religious faith also reveals something about personal character, and voters should determine whether the principles that guide the life and lifestyle of candidates is consonant or compatible with their own. While this is highly subjective, voters might think twice about voting for a member of, for example, the Branch Davidians whose apocalyptic outlook on the world was rather bleak and extreme. One might not want to vote for someone who, in principle, espoused a religious faith that did not recognize the right of "infidels" (a word that is used for those "not faithful" and not belonging to one's religious tradition) to live. In the nuclear age, someone who believed that cleansing the world of human life is a prerequisite for the coming age might not be the wisest choice.

In the current race (as in other past electoral contests), the religious faith of two Republican candidates has been characterized as a "cult" by an evangelical Christian pastor. Both candidates and other supporters have been quick to object to that characterization of their religious tradition, "Mormonism," the customary name of the religion of adherents of the Church of Jesus Christ and Latter-day Saints.

Despite the objections of these candidates, the evangelical pastor was technically correct, though morally wrong in his use of the word "cult" to describe Mormonism. Mormonism is NOT Christian in the sense that all "mainline" Christian traditions--including the Orthodox Church--use the term: that Jesus Christ is the unique and eternal Son of God, uniquely born of the Virgin Mary, and uniquely saves humanity by the Holy Spirit to the glory of God the Father. "Mainline" Christians are trinitarian monotheists, something that Mormons are not. "Mainline" Christians affirm that the canonical Old and New Testaments are the sole written canonical scriptures, something that Mormons do not (they received the name "Mormons" after the Book of Mormon, a compilation of additional texts "revealed" to Joseph Smith and believed to be an "additional" revelation of God). The Church of Jesus Christ and Latter-day Saints is NOT recognized as a Christian body by the World Council of Churches (WCC) and, in the USA, by the National Council of Churches in Christ (NCCC). The only thing "Christian" about Mormonism is the reference to Jesus Christ in their official title and their use of the Christian scriptures as part of their written revelation--supplemented by their prophet Joseph Smith and subsquent prophets, such as Brigham Young.

I can define myself as a neurosurgeon, but the "other" neurosurgeons would not identify me as such. This is the case of Mormons calling themselves Christians.

Now Rev. Jeffries, an evangelical Protestant minister, has for several years opposed candidates for any office that are not Christian, and such is his right. He was correct to note that, by the standards of the Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Episcopalian/Anglican Communion, and the "mainline" Protestant churches represented in the WCC and NCCC, Mormons are not Christians. Yet his motives were probably less than pure when he referred to Mormonism as a "cult." Technically, the word means any worshipping body--and it applies to his community as well.

Traditionally, several faith traditions--most originating in the USA--have been classified as "Christian cults", including Jehovah's Witness, Seventh Day Adventists, Christian Scientists, and Mormons. None of these groups shares the basic tenets of the ancient Christian faith--each denying in some manner the uniqueness of Jesus Christ or denying in some form the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. So Jeffries was technically correct in this regard and his remarks could have been uncontroversial if he explained his use of the word "cult."

Yet he did not, and in so doing allowed his audience (or perhaps a good portion of the American public to whom his comments would be reported) to associate the word "cult" with its more common use in American civil discourse: a "fringe" group with ideas that Christians not only find heretical, but that almost all Americans would associate with dangerous and unhealthy practices (like the Branch Davidians, the "Moonies", and other extremist groups; Charles Manson's "Family" was referred to a cult). Without drawing attention to the distinction between extremist groups and those that have had little problem coexisting with their neighbors in the USA (the Mormons have officially banned certain practices that are illegal in the USA, such as polygyny [more than one wife]), Jeffries allowed the inference that Mormons were to be equated with extremist groups such as that which permitted Jim Jones to convince the majority of his followers to commit suicide.

In the United States, one of the advantages of our nation compared to others is the freedom of religion and the fact that persons of diverse religious beliefs can live together without religious strife and hostility (compare this to almost any other nation in Europe--where even different Christian groups clash violently--or the MIddle East). Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Taoists, and numerous other traditions live side by side without too much trouble--though their are exceptions.

In my estimation, Mormons officially espouse some rather wacky doctrines (I use "wacky" in its technical meaning of rather crazy and irrational), but I also know that most Mormons might be shocked to learn of these. Most probably became Mormon for the same reason most Christians did: they were born into the Church. Mormonism was at one time (perhaps still is in some parts) the fastest growing religious tradition in the USA and Canada--but probably not because of their formal doctrine. Rather, it is the lifestyle of contemporary Mormonism that many people find attractive. Compared to Christian values regarding outward lifestyle, Mormons would not appear much different and, in fact, perhaps live out their values more consistently and properly than many "mainline" Christians. On those matters of common concern to Americans, Mormons are neither more nor less capable of representing their fellow citizens than those of any other faith tradition.

When John F. Kennedy ran for President, there was great suspicion that a Roman Catholic like him might be tempted to sacrifice American sovereignty to the Pope--fears that were shown to be completely unfounded. As it turns out, I doubt Kennedy would be rated such a good Catholic by the Pope in any event if well publicized rumors about him are true. Numerous elected officials of the Roman Catholic tradition have well demonstrated their ability to represent their constituents contrary to the official doctrine they personally espouse. Orthodox Christian officials have done the same, as have Jewish, Muslim, Sikh and Hindu officials in office within the USA.

Whether or not one should vote for someone who espouses the principles of one faith and is comfortable acting contrary to it is another question--one that is legitimately asked of persons who make their religious beliefs known. I personally would not vote for someone with whom I disagreed on very basic principles intrinsic to my faith in Christ Jesus regarding human life and the world in which we live. But I certainly recognize that on those public matters of concern to all Americans, persons of different faith traditions can find common ground and agree on certain principles, rules of social conduct, laws, and so forth, even if they are members of a cult.

A Mormon candidate may have more in common with my beliefs than someone who claims to be an adherent of a "mainline" Christian tradition or even the Orthodox Church but does not stand resolutely for the principles and values of that tradition. The same may be said of an adherent of Judaism, Hindusim, agnosticism or any other religious tradition.

It is simply incorrect and unrealistic to state, as so many did in reaction to Jeffries, that "religion shouldn't matter." It should, but only insofar as it reveals to us something about the personal character and beliefs of the person we entrust with leadership and public office.

Retirement of Hierarchs?

2011-08-31T17:19:00.003-05:00

NOTE: The blog below was composed prior to the announcement of the retirement, for health reasons, of His Eminence Metropolitan Maximos of Pittsburgh (formally announced September 2, 2011). While the point may be subtle, my position described below does not preclude a hierarch retiring for just such a reason, and I mainly question the mandatory retirement of bishops.

His Eminence Metropolitan Maximos was a beloved pastor and theologian commanding great respect and admiration well beyond the boundaries of the Metropolis of Pittsburgh, and we pray for his health and well-being during these days of his retirement from active ministry.
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The rather surprising voluntary retirement of the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Zakynthos has caused a type of stir within the Orthodox Church of Greece and presents a serious question to contemporary Orthodox: should a bishop of the Church retire? Should, or can, any clergy retire? The answers seem obvious, but are really not when we take into account the doctrine of the Church, her canonical tradition, and so forth.

We are used to persons reaching a certain age in their professions or occupations and then retiring. Retirement seems rather normal in our contemporary world, and even in the Church retirements of clergy are really not uncommon at all. Parish priests routinely retire from “active service” (as if there is such a thing as non-active service). In the United States today, the common or typical retirement age is 65 years of age. Obviously some work longer, some retire earlier, but in some circles reaching (and enjoying) retirement has become a goal and ideal.

This was not always the case. In many ways, the current retirement age (and it varies nation to nation, and even by occupation) was developed once social welfare for the aged became the norm in the cultural and economic West. At the time, 65 years was about the life expectancy of a human being in the West. Because of the level of healthcare in that day and other factors, one did not really expect to live all that long after “retirement” even if there were notable exceptions.

Today, this situation is far different. While the retirement age (and age requirements for Social Security) have not changed, life expectancy in the last fifty years has risen rather dramatically. Men can now reasonably expect, on average, to live over a decade after retirement.

In the ancient Church, “retirement” was a rare among clergy as it was among all people: except for the exceptionally wealthy, the concept did not exist: you worked out of necessity until death. And while life expectancy was much lower, this was largely due to a much higher infant mortality rate, so people still would regularly live on to their seventies if not longer. Of course, in the Byzantine Empire, a “social welfare” program of a sort did exist for the elderly: monasticism. Retirement to a monastery was rather common for elderly persons (even couples would enter separate monasteries in their later years). But that did not mean they did not work!

Turning more specifically to the question of clergy retiring, Metropolitan Cyrillos of Kifissia had this to day:

“The Sacred Canons presuppose that the Metropolitan has physical ability - not for administrative work, but to conduct a service. To give Communion. To travel around the diocese. But if you cannot stand by yourself and do everything, does it make sense to continue to be a Metropolitan?“

Actually, with all due respect, this is an interpretation of the Holy Canons, for those canons held to be authoritative by all Orthodox Churches throughout the world do not envision “retirement” of any sort for bishops of the Church. Indeed, nowhere does it suggest that a hierarch retire for any reason, though the canons have much to say about the reasons a hierarch might be removed from his position if in violation of the Holy Canons or for reasons of heresy.

In fact, Metropolitan Cyrillos seems to suggest that the office of the hierarch is one of function. If a person cannot fulfill the function, they should no longer be in the position. Yet such a view is problematic, since it does exclude a number of “functions” of the hierarch, not to mention it ignores in large measure the very role and relationship a hierarch has to the local Church over which he presides.

(As an aside, there are a number of other problems with the interpretation, not least of which is the assumption that the hierarch is expected to travel around his episcopal see or diocese. Today, these are enormously greater in size than in ancient times, though travel is now much easier.)

At 48 years of age, Metropolitan Cyrillos is largely corrected by his senior Greek hierarch, Metropolitan Damaskinos of Maroni, active at 92 years of age. The senior clerics, though noting a Metropolitan might be able to retire for personal reasons (there is great precedent), this should be seen as an exception to a greater, general rule:

“A Bishop is made such for life. Figuratively speaking, he enters into marriage with the Church, with a diocese, with his flock…”

In the Church, all of us share in the membership of Christ’s Body, but what differs among the members is the type or mode of the relationship we have with all others. Clergy do not only fulfill a “function,” but—especially hierarchs—stand as the “father” of the household of the local Church (this is why the bishops, and then later the parish priests, came to be called “father”). One does not retire from being a father to his children, nor can he “retire” from his marital relationship—even if fathers can abandon their children and can divorce their wives.

When a diocese is vacant—without a bishop—it is said to be, in the Church, “widowed.” Indeed, the age-old practice of the Church was to wait until the bishop died even to think of a replacement. Yes, bishops did retire for personal reasons on occasion, but this was at one time exceptional. If a bishop left his diocese for any reason other than transfer (itself a problematic canonical issue!) to another or death, it was usually because a synod of bishops felt the need to remove him (and of course this was not a positive situation).

Indeed, viewing the role of the hierarch in the local church as purely functionary is a dangerous symptom of our contemporary ecclesiological problems (yes, there are problems—more than one). We could obviously extend this to all parish clergy as well, largely seen as functionaries. At the hierarchal level, this is somewhat understandable insofar as the hierarchal “see,” the local church over which he presides “in the place and manner of Christ,” has far outgrown the capacity of any person to pastorally care for it; dioceses typically consist of many thousands of faithful.

Early on, starting around the third and largely complete by the late fourth century in most parts of the Christian world, the manner by which the Church dealt with a growing membership was to extend the Eucharistic gathering (the Divine Liturgy) under the presidency of the bishop to outlying areas with the permission and under the oversight of the bishop, the beginning of what we call parishes today led by presbyters.

Today, most of the faithful never truly can consider the bishop of their church to be their (spiritual) “father” and pastor (shepherd), if only because they have probably not had any direct contact with him. As such, it is not a leap to view the bishop’s role as one that is first administrative and only occasionally liturgical and pastoral. Needless to mention is the fact that this is directly the opposite view of our doctrinal premise regarding our Eucharist and the clergy. And if the bishop is primarily an administrator and not a father, then it is little wonder that the bishop is perceived as being a functionary of the Church (basically, a bureaucrat) who is “rated” or evaluated according to function and performance. Once function and performance is impaired, a new bureaucrat is judged beneficial.

If, however, we consider the Church from the perspective of the family (father, brethren, etc.), none of us would even be tempted to rate our parents in such terms: when they can no longer travel, function, or think clearly, we do not replace them as parents—abuse and neglect of elder parents notwithstanding as this is plainly wrong. Nor do parents, in principle, retire from parenting even if it does take different forms as the children grown and mature.

In the Church, it is dangerous to believe that clergy (or any member, for that matter) is ever to be mandatorily “retired.” From ancient times, the role of the hierarch (and only by extension, the presbyters in the parishes) was modeled—in part—on the ideal household based on the virtue of communion and love. That transcends functionality.

True, the modern world in which we live has placed new and different demands on those entrusted with the administration of churches, if only because they have become huge operations involving thousands of persons. From a management point of view, such an organization that has become common in all Orthodox churches is rather inefficient and, perhaps, less than ideally efficient. The answer is not to distort the doctrine of the Church by changing the role and perception of the hierarch by turning him into a professional bureaucrat waiting for an impending retirement. The answer is to return to those principles by which the Church first organized her life and membership so that we may actually experience and live out the ecclesiological principles we as Orthodox claim as our own.

Stephen Hawking's Faith in the Singularity

2011-08-23T16:48:00.000-05:00

The fact that such an eminent scientist such as Stephen Hawking should believe that “God is unnecessary” (as he writes in his co-authored book, The Grand Design) for the origin of the universe is hardly surprising. Part of his scientific quest ignores, in principle, that which cannot be proven and God cannot be proven. Unfortunately, however, Hawking moves well behind the realm of science in his cosmological theory about the origins of the universe, and his “controversial” statement is subject to great misunderstanding. This is due to the fact that his positing the universe could form “spontaneously” is actually not a testable hypothesis (and therefore, according to most definitions of what science is, not scientific). It is a philosophical premise. As such, it is also not even wrong—to use a classification of another eminent physicist, Wolfgang Pauli for un-verifiable hypotheses. And in such, Hawking shows himself to be a man of faith.

We must first, however, deal with the “necessary” from a scientific and theological viewpoint. Even if God is not necessary for the origin of the universe, this is strictly neither an argument in favor or against God’s reality and being. Simply because something is unnecessary does not mean it is unreal or has no being (take rap music as an example). Simply because the universe, according to some unproven theories and hypotheses could have come into existence spontaneously does not mean that it could not have been purposely created. Hawking may not believe in a personal God (as he describes his perspective; interestingly allowing for an impersonal God when interviewed on the subject of his belief), but this is different than denying the existence of such a God. So Hawking is not undertaking an exercise in militant atheism. The assertions he makes are, strictly speaking from a religious view, agnostic on the subject of God.

In a recent television episode of Curiosity (Disovery Network; the primier episode), Hawking reviewed, basically, the thesis of The Grand Design. He specifically claims that he is not trying to offend anyone who believes in God, only that he does not believe it is necessary to posit God as creator. There are, in his view, sufficient ways the universe could have originated without presuming a conscious creation.

In short, the reason that the universe can, in his view, come into being spontaneously, is that there is no time in the “singularity.” There is, in short, no time for any cause for the universe. The “effect” that results in the universe therefore has no underlying cause: it just happened because there was no time for anything to occur “before.” This flies in the face of centuries of philosophical and scientific thought that presumed every effect has a cause. Even Aristotle had to acknowledge an “unmoved mover” (an uncaused cause) in logical thought and, as a good ancient Greek philosopher, considered Time eternal and formally distinct from space and matter. Yet the empirical verification of quantum mechanics has been known for some time to invalidate this fundamental axiom (“something cannot come from nothing”) under certain conditions and in a qualified way to which I will return below.

Nonetheless, Hawking here seems to be bending the rules of logical argumentation through a free use of terminology with shifting definitions. He also presumes that his audience is unaware that some of the factors he discusses are still debated in the scientific world; many reputable physicists would take serious issue with many of his premises.

I am not a physicist, and what I know of theoretical physics I have learned mainly through Hawking himself (often “translating” Einstein and others). For example, for objects traveling close to the speed of light, time—being relative—slows. This is proven experimentally. The common conclusion is that at the speed of light (in a vacuum, anyway), time stops (or proceeds at a rate of zero). But this is also relative, for the observers of a particle of light, as they are moving appreciably slower than the light, are capable of measuring the time it takes for light to move from one location to another. Apparently, the light would have no consciousness of this if light had consciousness, getting to Einstein’s famous quotation (here slightly paraphrased): Time is what keeps everything from happening at once.

Indeed, for Einstein, space and time form a continuum that, if viewed from the “outside,” would contain all of space and all the events of time within it. Physicist Brian Greene uses an analogy of a loaf of bread. Our observations of time, causes and effects—the distinction of moments—is in effect simply a slicing of the loaf into pieces. The reality, according to physics, is that the loaf is all there (which includes the future we have not yet observed but which an outside observer could, theoretically, see). In other words, past, present and future are all really simultaneous. It is only the observers inside the “loaf” who distinguish between them.

Of course, all this is predicated on a mathematical view of the universe, and we obviously cannot verify that what we perceive to be the future already exists. Still, even this idea is not radically incompatible with the idea of God. In the Christian tradition, God remains distinct from the universe God creates, and therefore does, in some sense, see the whole “loaf” at once. Inside the loaf, we cannot. But the timelessness of God (that God is not naturally subject in any manner to the distinction of past, present, future or motion from past to present to future) is a fundamental axiom of Orthodox Christian theology. And as we observe with light, the idea of timelessness does not automatically rule out motion, cause or effect—light certainly moves, and is often a cause and an effect. Yet from the mathematical equations of science, light is timeless (while everything else, moving slower than light, is within the flow of time).

Hawking does not explain—and really cannot in any definitive sense—how an infinitely small and infinitely dense “singularity” in which all energy is compacted, can be “infinitesimally” small. Again, mathematically, the equations used may lead to infinite probabilities (as when trying to combine gravity with quantum mechanics) or even infinite measurements of states, but these are themselves absurd in the strict sense. Physicists and cosmologists have not been able really to conduct any sensible mathematical explanation for the “Big Bang” itself, and can only work back to a fraction of a second after the bang. Prior to that moment, the equations actually become non-sensical (resulting in the infinities that render calculations meaningless). An infinitely small and infinitely dense singularity is not a finding of science; it is a presumption (and for Hawking, we must then presume infinite in the more technical meaning of “immeasurable”). Physicists freely acknowledge this, and it is the basic problem that prevents them from reconciling the Special Theory and General Theory of Relativity with Quantum Mechanics.

Hawking presumes that the singularity’s infinitely small size and infinite density makes it subject to the probabilities of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics works in many real-world applications, without doubt, and offers a glimpse of the world far stranger than anyone could fathom (and even physicists have difficulty both describing and visualizing). But the irreconcilable differences between Quantum Mechanics and the theories of relativity (dealing with gravity) mean that something else is occurring that we have yet to discover. So any explanation of what occurred at the moment of the Big Bang is premature at best.

That something “banged” and provides a cause for the universe we can observe now is beyond reasonable doubt: we can see the galaxies of the universe all moving away from each other which means they were once closer together. But there is still much for us to understand.

Nonetheless, Hawking does not really claim that the universe came from absolute nothingness (or that the energy/matter—E=mc²means they are basically the flipside of the coin from the other—did that would result in our universe). After all, it is non-sensical to speak of an “infinitely dense” or “infinitely small” nothing. Nothingness—absolute no thing—has no density or size whatsoever. Something banged. Hawking simply claims that because there was no time prior to the bang (which philosophically makes sense since time is a measurement of change or motion through space), there was no “time” for any cause to produce the bang.

And none of this infringes on the basic Judeo-Christian premise that God created the universe and the conditions of the universe at the time of the Big Bang. Such a view is wholly compatible with the intent, if not exact description, of the opening chapter of Genesis (which is not a scientific treatise and was not intended to be one).

Hawking and other scientists who discount the role of God as creator have developed what they view to be a rational explanation for how the universe came to be. Intellectual honesty among scientists—and this includes Hawking—also excludes any notion that they can answer the question as to why the universe came to be. Hawking, by positing a spontaneous generation of the universe is actually reverting to the same type of argument for the spontaneous generation theory of life—one long ago disproven—though on a much larger scale. The alternative is to posit an eternal universe, a reversion to the monism of the ancient Greeks, and one that many theorists today resort to (multiverses and so forth) in order to make sense of their data.

Einstein’s theories of relativity and quantum mechanics (which even Einstein had trouble accepting) have deeply changed the manner by which we view and understand our physical universe. In the words of Einstein, it is sometimes “spooky,” and echoing this is Brian Greene’s notion that the universe is “spooky and weird.” Yet these scientific models are only examples of different perspectives of our universe, and the models are actually incompatible. More is needed; a new scientific model is required to explain what we actually see in our universe.

That the realm of the very big (affected by gravity) and the very, very small (quantum mechanics and particle physics) do not “mesh” together very well is a mystery and a wonder. The complexity of the universe is truly astonishing and wonderful. This led the ancient Psalmist to praise God for the stars, the sun, the moon, the valleys and mountains and so forth. As we proclaim at the Baptismal rites and the Great Blessing of the Waters: “Great are You, O Lord, and marvelous are Your works, and no words are sufficient to hymn Your wonders!” It is clear that we are far from having sufficient words and analytical tools to explain them.

Christians believe that God’s word (and the Word and Spirit!) brought all that exists into being. Stephen Hawking believes that God is not necessary for the universe to come into being. Maybe Hawking will one day be proven correct: that it could have happened without God, but neither he nor anyone else will be able to prove that it did happen without God. After all, Christians add one important bit of information that Hawking leaves out when he posits a “singularity” of infinitely small size and density: for Christians, God creates ex nihilo (from nothing, no pre-existing “stuff”); for Hawking the universe comes from something (the singularity). He will still one day have to explain what that something is that explains energy and matter. Christian affirm in faith—the existence of things hoped for—that God has brought all that exists into being from nothing. No scientist can explain how you get something from nothing at all. If a scientist holds to such a position, this too is a matter of faith.

The Aburdity of Normal

2011-08-20T12:59:00.000-05:00

What is normal? For the demographer or statistician, normalcy might be considered a greater majority. But when speaking from the perspective of the Church we can speak about normal in a way that virtually excludes all of us, so that "normal" or "abnormal" takes on a very different meaning. I bring this up due to some comments from persons regarding my most recent and previous posting.

Saint Maximos the Confessor, in a now rather well known comment on the Aereopagitc corpus (at least among Orthodox theologians--but they're not normal!), notes that (to paraphrase in translation), the things of the Old Testament are shadow, those of the New Testament are an image (icon), and those of the Kingdom are truth. This means that what is true does not depend on the beginning of things, or even as they are in the present, but rather on their final state.

On the human plane of existence, we can see this in the typically Orthodox Christian denial of the perfection of Adam and Eve. They were obviously not perfect or they would not have sinned! This does not require the thought that God created them imperfectly, or that they were imperfect at the beginning in the sense of deficient. Adam and Eve were created for a purpose, a vocation, and it is the answer to that calling (vocation=calling) that determines the truth of their existence. Thus, on a "timeline" of human life, the truth of life is found at the end, not at the beginning. In a more practical sense, we can observe this simply in the common life-cyle: at birth it would be rather difficult to suggest that the human being is "complete"; there is growth and maturity and decisions...the person develops, and "who" they are is not something pre-determined from the beginning, but something that actually requires a lifetime to determine.

Yet bringing this back to the concept of normal, from a Christian perspective we must also admit that God's will is normative for created existence ("Thy will be done..."). Anything contrary to God's will would be sin, and this is obviously not normal for human beings created in the image according to the likeness of God. Thus, with the exception of any human being who may never sin or be bound somehow by the corruptive nature of sin and death (so basically everyone except for Jesus Christ who was alone sinless and whose death was strictly voluntarily), all human beings in such a perspective fail in some manner to be normal. And if not normal, they also fail to be truly human.

The point is that apart from communion in Christ--sharing the common existence of Christ--all human life is in some manner abnormal, and it shall not truly be normal until the advent of the fullness of the Kingdom in the new creation. Until that time, any consideration of what is "normal" or abnormal in human existence is bound to fall into the trap of objectification of the human being and thereby diminish our capacity to view that being as person--unique in and of him/herself. As soon as we identify the "abnormal" outside of our own selves, we inevitably fragment human nature by setting up a division between ourselves and the "other," and this is strictly ruled out by the commandment to love.

In the Church we can and must distinguish between normative behavior according to the will of God (virtuous) and sinful actions that separate and divide (thereby destroying communion). This is what the commandment to love our enemies is all about, as well as all the warnings against hypocrisy.

Acceptance of sinful actions is not a possibility for the Church, but acceptance of the repentant sinner is the mandate of the Church, and therefore it is silly and simply an absurdity to categorize as normal or abnormal when, to some degree, we all fall into the latter. If sinners of any stripe are unacceptable to the Church, then the Church remains confined to Jesus Christ alone whose Body it is.

Be Careful What You Ask For--Church discourse and homosexuality

2011-08-16T23:12:00.000-05:00

A letter to the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church in Amercia (OCA) from a number of "college students and young adults" was posted on a website this week concerning recent statements regarding homosexuality by OCA clergy on still another website. These supposedly hurtful and insulting comments came about in an online discussion concerning same-sex marriage, itself prompted by the recent legalization of such marriages in New York State. New York is not the first state to have them, though it is the first of several to have legalized same-sex marriage by legislative choice rather than judicial imposition. The New York law elicited an "official" response from OCA hierarchs, thus prompting a wider discussion by parish clergy. Subsequently, the OCA layman who allowed this discussion--several postings--on his own website was removed from the OCA governing "Metropolitan Council" and the administrative council of the Diocese of the Midwest. How's that by way of introduction?

Surprisingly, the letter by the college students was the most level-headed and thoughtful of all the postings, but it was misdirected. After all, at the heading of their letter to the OCA Synod, they quote a prior statement:

“Men and women with homosexual feelings and emotions are to be treated with the understanding, acceptance, love, justice and mercy due to all human beings.” -- 1992 Synodal Affirmations On Marriage, Family, Sexuality, and the Sanctity of Life, Holy Synod of Bishops of the Orthodox Church in America

Interestingly, much of the "discourse" on homosexuality that these young adults protest came as responses to a posting that actually seemed to suggest that the CHurch should accept same-sex marriage, though it became subsequently clear that the author was misunderstood; he was only asking how to fulfill the spirit of the 1992 Synodal Affirmation for same-sex couples that might appear in the parish. Nonetheless, the authors of the protest letter had a valid point: much of the discourse on the topic was ugly commentary on a posting simply questioning the Church's response to same-sex marriage.

In fact, the college students and young adults did not seek to justify homosexual behavior or question Church doctrine, and for this they deserve credit for their tone and restraint. And yet where they err is when they make baseless accusations that are becoming more and more typical in American political discourse. They write,

It is certainly not our purpose to advocate for “homosexual rights” (none of us has a “right” to salvation), to question Orthodox doctrine, or to justify sinful behavior. Nevertheless, we cannot accept that the only alternative is purging the Church of gay people who, like the rest of us, are endeavoring to live the most godly life they are able to under the guidance of a spiritual advisor.

To my knowledge, nobody, least of all the OCA Synod, has suggesting a purging of anybody, including "gay people." This is precisely an example of the "overheated and destructive language" they decry coming from those who would speak harshly about persons of homosexual orientation in the Church. In fact, the authors add to the "destructive" language of the "culture wars" by even implying that such a purge is contemplated by the OCA Synod.

That such a "purge" might be envisioned by persons who claim to be Orthodox Christians (but actually cannot be by holding such a position) can be readily admitted. That this has anything to do with the official position or doctrine of the Church is absolutely false--which the authors seem prepared to admit in their rather confused presentation. After all, in a preceding paragraph they write,

In the wake of a string of suicides by American students persecuted for their homosexuality -- a tragic trend which has not left our Church untouched -- our consciences do not permit us to ignore the language of revilement directed by some in the Church towards gay people.

Now the ambiguity of the first part of the sentence could be read as to suggest that the "tragic trend" of persecuting persons for their homosexuality (the authors obviously do not separate orientation from acts here) is what has "touched" the Church, but this is not the case. The Church does not persecute persons of a homosexual orientation. Nor does the Church persecute persons involved in homosexual activity.

However, as the students and young adults seem to admit, the Church does not condone homosexual activity. It does not accept that same-sex marriages are a legitimate expression or manifestation of love between two human beings. Admitting this, and even announcing such a stance publicly, is a responsibility for the Church. Doing so does not mean that the Church is condemning anyone in particular.

The sentiment expressed by the students and young adults is certainly correct, for their intention is to ensure that the call and proclamation of the truth by the Church does not fall on deaf ears among young persons who may be of a homosexual orientation. Condemnatory, hurtful language is often not the way to go to communicate effectively.

On the other hand, condemnatory and hurtful language may be heard even when it is not intended to be injurious or condemnatory. In the discourse that constitutes our American "culture wars", there is often an undue sensitivity that make authentic communication quite impossible. Words mean things and not only express what we think, but also affect how we think.

Take the word, "homophobia." Literally, it means a "fear of man" (Latin homo means "man"). It was used to mean, first "fear of homosexuality" and then it simply became a catch-all for any opposition to homosexuality in any guise or form. The Church is, supposedly, "homophobic" for not permitting or accepting same-sex marriages. But in the literal sense, this is absurd. The Church fears nothing: "the Lord is with us; whom shall we fear?"

The public debate on homosexuality certainly ventures into absurdity. It is claimed that homosexual orientation and/or activity is "normal" because--as is sometimes claimed--up to ten percent of the population either identifies itself as gay/lesbian or has had homosexual "feelings" or desires, or because it has a "genetic" cause, or because certain mammals in the remainder of the animal kingdom practice it occasionally. Such assertions stemming from the gay and lesbian communities are not reallty a defense of normalcy in the human population, and certainly make no real substantial case for morality. About eighty-five percent of human beings, by most estimates, are right-handed. Fifteen percent are left-handed (like me). Fifteen percent is a deviation from the norm--and why there was a traditional prejudice against "sinister" (from the Latin for "left") people in most ancient and modern societies.

The point is not to label anyone normal or abnormal. The point is that the discourse on both sides of the debates we associate with the so-called "culture-wars" commonly ventures into absurdity.

Unfortunately, as I see it, the college students and young adults who felt compelled to complain about discourteous and even hateful language are participating in the very type of debate they protest. They only managed to reiterate the official position of the OCA to whom they were protesting. They sought to silence debate on a matter they admit is an important one for the Church--and I certainly sympathize with their position: why any clergyman thought it appropriate to ask a hypothetical question on the Internet regarding an obviously divisive topic is beyond me, and why anyone managing a supposedly Orthodox Christian website would allow vitriolic hate speech to be aired on their own forum is also beyond me. But the reality is that most of the comments were actually sympathetic to the tone and tenor of these students and young adults. The abnormal voices of those who would condemn persons of a homosexual orientation, or participants in homosexual acts, as opposed to the myriad sins committed by supposedly "normal" people of a heterosexual orientation can be easily recognized as not being Christian or Orthodox.

Indeed, by seeking to quash the public airing of opinion--which is, in effect the remedy requested by this letter since the loving discourse and debate they seek would not be authentic and honest without the other side of the debate, and the easiest recourse for Church officials is to simply ban or ignore such discussion--there will be no voice to those members of the Church that recognize the pastoral complexity of dealing with persons of a homosexual orientation in a manner that is both understanding and, when necessary, forgiving. This does not require the Church to accept what she cannot accept; but the Church can certainly always accept those persons seeking the Kingdom of God in sincerity, love and truth--no matter how close or far they may be from "normal."

The Audacity of Debt

2011-07-30T14:55:00.000-05:00

What our opponents have done on the other side of the aisle is reckless, unpatriotic, foolish and dangerous, which is why I stand before the American people ready to work with them on a serious compromise. The time for deals is over, and if we are going to settle this crisis where all Americans will be affected, we must set aside the petty partisan squabbles of our past and seek a better future.

Let me repeat, I am not here to blame those on the other side of the aisle who have single-handedly created this crisis by standing by their convictions and doing exactly what they said they would do when they were running for election. It is not my place, as the only adult in the room, to accuse others of acting immaturely and being silly, no matter how much their foolish naivete has brought this nation to the brink of destruction. Rather, it is my job to lead from behind, and lest you and the rest of the American people believe that I am irrelevant, it is never irrelevent to believe that I am necessary.

Nonetheless, unless we act quickly and decisively, we will not be able to speedily solve the problems facing our country. If you are a recipient of Social Security Checks, you may not get them despite the fact that it is against the law to withhold your checks since the Social Security Administration has the legal responsibility to pay from funds that have no affect on the present threat to all our lives.

This is the crux of the issue: the present threat of a credit downgrade will not only increase global warming--which is why I spent a good deal of time this past week insisting that auto makers double our fuel efficiency by 2026--and kill more polar bears who will drown for lack of polar ice, it will cause the countless seniors of our country to contract painful hemoragghic fever, and once they begin bleeding from their eyes, there is no telling what will be in store. I am sure, however, that my friends on the other side of the aisle will choose to take all seniors and throw them over a cliff. This is serious.

And so it is time for us to realize that I am not to blame for this crisis I have created, but rather the very persons to blame are those whom we need now to be serious. We need them to agree with our plan, despite it not being a detailed account of how the problem will be solved, as a sign of compromise, for this is the nature of adults working together. Compromise means agreement with our plan, for there really is no other choice.

The other choice, which is really no choice, is to choose another way. Those on the other side of the aisle, whom I do not blame despite their immaturity, foolishness, and passing the most atrocious and evil legislation this nation has ever seen, have proposed cutting spending. They have proposed cutting about $38 billion this year, even as I have, and up to $4trillion over the next eight years--that's six years after their authority to cut ends. I have also agreed that cutting $38 billion dollars from the trillions we will spend this year is doable, but cutting $4 trillion over eight years is impossible. That would bring us to the brink of disaster. So I have proposed an alternative: cutting the same amount over ten years. Most of this would be back-loaded, which is a means of saying that we cannot guarantee that it will be cut at all, since we can only guarantee cuts for the year we are in, and this is how it should be. This is a serious plan from a serious man as I am. My partners in the Congress have already agreed that this plan, which will immediately cut just 3.8 cents for every $1,000 we will spend this year, is doable, and far more reasonable that a plan to cut waste, fraud and abuse recently suggested by someone on the other side of the aisle taking the advice of my administration's General Accounting Office.

This is more recklessness and irresponsibility. If we were to cut the actual waste and fraud and unncessary expenditures, we would be worse than Greece, Spain, Portugal and other nations that have stopped paying people for doing nothing, bringing on hardship and dire repercussions to politicians who made promises in this regard, even as I have.

I came into office with an audacious plan for hope and change. If we cut more than 3.8 cents for every thousand dollars we spend, we will not be able to meet all the commitments that those on my side of the aisle have made. Without an immediate lifting of the debt ceiling, which President Reagan allowed thirteen times over eight years, or approximately once every 7 months, our credit rating will be downgraded by the same rating companies that gave the highest rating to the sub-prime mortgage markets. I want to be like Ronald Reagan, asking for the lifting of the debt ceiling that not once in the history of our nation has prevented the United States Congress from spending more than we could afford. And even surpassing Reagan, who allowed it to rise once every seven months, I want to raise it enough to last until at least the next Presidential elections are passed us, so we don't have to worry about these type of ideological fights while I am trying to regain my Presidency.

Ideology means a belief in ideas, and ideology is totally wrong for our nation at this time. It was right for our nation when we did not compromise on health care reform. It was right when we went ahead and with a blind faith in Keynesian economic theory, we passed the stimulus act that has saved every job remaining in America, and has put millions more of our fellow citizens to work trying to find adequate employment. So ideology is good when it is the ideology I share, but totally wrong for those on the other side of the aisle.

They are evil and have no good intentions for our country, that is the simple truth I share with you this day. I repeat: they are evil and intend the destruction of our country, which is exactly why I believe we have the opportunity to work closely together to solve this crisis without name-calling or abusive threats about patriotism and motives. This is the time for leadership from behind.

Let me sum up this way...there is no chance that those on the other side of the aisle have anyting but destructive, evil ideas on how to solve the crisis before us, one created by those on the side of the aisle of my own political allies. So the time is ripe for taking ideas from both sides, without ideology, and make a deal now before my birthday party is ruined.

Unless you sit on the other side of the aisle, God bless you, and God bless the United States of America!

Liberty and A Nation "Under God"

2011-07-04T16:43:00.000-05:00

On Independence Day, our nation recalls the founding of our country, steeped in the idea of freedom. The notion of freedom that the Founding Fathers valued so highly had a long history, but mostly as a concept taken from Western cultural premises.

We can rightly be thankful for the efforts of that generation of "Americans" and all those following that allow us today to be generally "free" from the type of governments we routinely see elsewhere in the world based on tyrrany.

Yet Orthodox Christian should also recognize that the idea of freedom on which our nation is based is not necessarily "freedom" in its fullness. Certainly, the Founding Fathers of these United States enshrined a concept of "freedom from" all sorts of tyrrany, but there are still numerous forms of enslavement that plague us as a society: enslavement to our own desires, addictions, and needs. The Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution did not set us free from sin and death.

We typically think of freedom as the ability to not have anyone telling us what to do (to a limited degree, since we do in fact have lots of laws, regulations and restrictions on our freedom). Still, an Orthodox Christian perspective of freedom would see liberty not so much as a freedom "from" anything, but rather as a "freedom for" something, and that is specifically the freedom to become servants (slaves) to God--a freely chosen servitude. It is only then that freedom from necessity, from sin, and from death can be truly known and experienced.

So we may appreciate the freedoms bestowed on us by the generations who fought for them and protected them, as well as those members of our nation who continue to do so. But let us also recognized that our freedom is not yet complete. That requires a fight of another kind, a struggle in fulfillment of our mission (our commission) in Christ Jesus, the "liberator of our souls."

On Sunday

2011-06-27T23:04:00.000-05:00

This past Sunday during my sermon at the Divine Liturgy, among other thoughts, I commented on the Apostolic Reading from Saint Paul’s letter to the Romans (2:10-16). In those comments on our ability—God-given—to discern between right and wrong by the grace of the Holy Spirit, I made reference to how our contemporary society has changed the definition of what is right and wrong in several ways. One of those concerned same-sex marriage. But I believe it is also necessary for me to repeat some of those comments as well as to expand others on this subject.

First, I noted that the very definition of what constitutes a marriage, what the purpose of marriage is, has evolved in our society. For most of human history (and undoubtedly a great deal of pre-history, for that matter), society’s regulation of marriage through customary or legal sanction has been primarily due to the need for society to regulate population (hence blood testing of spouses to ensure safe procreation, or Rome’s legal requirement for women of child-bearing age to be married so to sustain population numbers, etc.). Secondarily, though perhaps just as important, was the maintenance of inheritable property through legitimate lines of descent. Related to this secondary notion was also the likely “evolutionary” impulse for males to ensure that offspring of “their” women were actually their own, a phenomenon widely observed in the animal kingdom related to the survival of the species.

(And before anyone objects to what may appear to be an endorsement of any evolutionary theory, I am not making an argument here about the origins of humanity; the “similarity” of human biological and even some elements of social life to that of the animals simply accords with the “degradation” of humanity following the Fall and has received ample comment in Orthodox patristic sources as well as contemporary theologians.)

Second, I noted that the “purposes” of the institution of matrimony in our society today has evolved into something beyond its original and primary regulation of population (inherent in the word “matrimony”—look up the etymology). Today, persons with no interest in procreating routinely are joined in marriage for the numerous “benefits” according to married persons in our society. A website promoting same-sex marriage lists, literally, hundreds of financial benefits accorded to spouses, not to mention other “privileges” both legal and customary in our society, but denied to single persons or to “partners” (same-sex or “opposite” sex”) who are not legal spouses.

Third, if I implied that same-sex marriage is wrong, and I did, I also implied that there is a certain logic behind the lobbying for the legalization of same-sex marriage in our society, something now legal in several states of our country and several nations in Europe (the fact that this is a phenomenon almost completely limited to “westernized” societies should not escape notice). The logic is that in our society (at least in the USA) the rights accorded to one must be the rights accorded to all. Beyond the semantic and constitutional argument as to whether marriage is a right (for example, it is illegal to have more than one spouse; it is illegal to marry a blood relative to the third degree, etc.), the reality is that the essential definition of and purposes of “heterosexual” marriage have been evolving in our society for some time to include matters that also would not be viewed as compatible with “traditional”, not to mention Orthodox, Christian teaching. One might add the social “degradation” of marriage with the rising rate of self-reported infidelity, the high rate of divorce, the increase of pre-marital sexual activity and the lack of any taboo attached to it or to pregnancy and “single” parenthood. In a phrase, marriage just ain’t what it used to be. So it is really no surprise that the definition of marriage, in part, as between a male and a female has changed for many.

As an Orthodox Christian pastor, this is all lamentable, not just the movement to same-sex marriage. Yet I must admit that there is something rather absurd about the notion of same-sex marriages being legally sanctioned by the government (not to mention “Christian” denominations).

This is not, however, the same as believing that there is no logic behind the drive for same-sex marriage. Part of that logic includes the sad and un-Christian “persecution” of persons who have a homosexual orientation, the denial of certain legal “privileges” and benefits to such persons, and so forth. Of course, permitting persons of the same sex to marry by no means, as some of those persons argue, “legitimizes” their relationship in the eyes of anyone; even if it legally legitimizes such relationships in the eyes of our system of justice, we might recall that ideally secular or civil justice is “blind.” Nonetheless, simply because the government says something is legal neither makes it right or just, and the crude prejudice against the homosexual community will not cease now that members of the gay and lesbian communities can now legally marry. In fact, the irony is that it will only be likely to provoke more instances of such prejudice and bigotry in an era where society was already becoming more tolerant to “alternative lifestyles” in general.

It would seem that the gay and lesbian lobby for same-sex marriage has overreached. Rather than accepting the notion of “civil unions” (with actual ancient precedent under Roman law) for same-sex couples that would allow them to receive many of the benefits and privileges accorded to married heterosexuals (such as being allowed to visit their partner in the hospital even over objections of blood relatives, of receiving survivor benefits and accorded similar legal protections for spouses, etc.), same-sex marriages—by that name—do, in fact diminish the very institution of matrimony. If same-sex marriage becomes the law of the land (the entire nation), then the advantage could be used by persons of the same sex who marry simply for the benefits, and not due to any underlying romantic or loving relationship. Such “abuses” of the system will undoubtedly make such benefits too expensive (where offered in the private sector), and ultimately redundant and useless in the public (governmental) sector. The unintended consequences of same-sex marriage maybe the actual loss of such privileges and benefits it was intended to gain in the first place.

Nonetheless, the third point I feel compelled to make is something I noted in my remarks on Sunday (which, in a short time, covered not only same-sex marriage by implication, but a number of other problematic circumstances in our society). That is—especially in regard to same-sex marriage—as Christians we have the duty to stand for what is right in the eyes of God, but without condemnation or castigation of our neighbor. Same-sex marriage is no more serious an issue for our society—and is actually less serious an issue for our society—than numerous other problems besetting us everyday: poverty, crime, violence and—on this point—ungodly and un-Christian marriages between males and females. Persons of a homosexual orientation are no more and no less sinners before God than persons of a heterosexual orientation: “no man shall live and sin not.” Same-sex marriage may be an absurdity if defined from a Christian perspective, but no more so than the absurdity of naming a pet dog as the beneficiary of a last will and testament (legal in this nation!) or allowing—as certain environmentalists desire—the trees or animals to have the right to be plaintiffs in litigation against other legal “persons.”

Indeed, awhile back a well-known conservative politician opposed to same-sex marriage was mocked for considering that it might lead to legally-sanctioned bestiality. Yet his point was not to draw an identity between persons of a homosexual orientation and practitioners of bestiality. It was to note that the crossing of such lines in our definitions of marriage led to a slippery slope. The bestiality analogy might have been extreme, but if same-sex marriage is a remedy against prejudice against persons of a homosexual orientation, what line will be crossed next? Bigamy or polygamy—something practiced by a minority that, arguably, should have the same rights as the next person. Marriage to minors (as widely practiced in non-western societies)? Why should we deny minors the same legal benefits as adults? And if evergreen tree or my pet dog will one day have the right to sue me in court—seriously, there are arguments to allow this—what would prevent the right of legal marriage being accorded to them? So marrying my pet dog could be one line that we, as a society, someday cross. Absurd—sure. Possible? Yes.

Something for Christians to get worried about? Absolutely not. In pagan Rome, Greece, Asia Minor, Egypt and elsewhere, the Church was confronted with many, many customs and socio-religious traditions that the Church deemed unacceptable and contrary to the faith. The Church did not withdraw from the world or condemn it—that is not our vocation in Christ Jesus. The Church preached the Good News of Christ and salvation, seeking to convert the world.

In the opening chapters of Romans, from which last Sunday’s apostolic reading was taken, Saint Paul does mention numerous “ills” of his society as subject to the wrath of God. Yet, to my knowledge, Saint Paul did not focus his preaching on such ills, on the bad news, but on the Gospel. This included, but was not limited to a critique of social ills. It included, but was not limited to, a call to repentance from what the Church considered sinful behavior. But on Mars Hill (the Areopagus) and elsewhere, Saint Paul did not condemn persons. He invited them to live a new way—regardless of what the Emperor or Senate legislated, regardless of what his fellow Jews or pagans thought was just or right.

Christians today have the same moral imperative to stand for what is right and good in the eyes of God based on God’s self-revelation to humanity in Christ. But we should never, ever, do so in the wrong way. We are not here to condemn it, but—for Christ, with Christ, and in Christ—to save it.

A (Non-) Candidate I Can Support

2011-05-16T14:41:00.000-05:00

I was glad to see that Huckabee declined to run for President of the United States last Saturday evening. It is not because I believe he is unqualified—as a former state governor, he would enter the race with far more experience than our current President did when he ran. I was glad because he is a Baptist minister.

Ancient canons of the Christian church prohibit clergy from holding governmental positions. Though this has been violated (in various ways) at times in the history of the Church, the general rule has been observed in the Christian East. Likewise, in the Roman Catholic Church this has been the rule even if the Pope of Rome is technically a head of state (Vatican City, and the Papal Estates before that). Nonetheless, the rule is for good reason.

The reason is not because, from earliest times, the Church held to a doctrine of a separation of Church and state in the sense we use the concept todaty—far from it. The United States Constitution forbids the establishment of a state church, or “official” religion. In this regard, the Church through history has certainly not opposed being the “official” religion of Empires and nation-states. Of course, such a position has not always been to the benefit of the Church. In ancient times, the alignment of the Church with the reigning political authority often led to actions—such as enforced baptism—that we frown upon today, and other actions can be clearly judged today as immoral. Even today, the close alignment with the government or official status of Orthodox Churches in Russia and Greece have proven problematic and inevitably have drawn the Church into socio-political controversies that the Church has not needed. Under the Communists or under the Colonels in Greece, the Church was susceptible to charges of or actual corruption, and political scandals continue to involve the so-called “national” churches and their clergy.

If the Holy Canons seek to prevent clergy from engaging in “political” authority, it is because there is a fundamental separation or distinction between Church and state. The nation-state is an authority in and of the world, even if such authority is, in some manner, granted by God for a time. The Church, however, is in the world, but is not “of the world.” The Church should and, at her best, does transcend the mundane concerns of state governance. The nation-state necessarily engages in activities that in some cases the Church cannot endorse or which violate doctrinal principles. Of course, some of the purposes of the nation-state do overlap or may coincide with the concerns of the Church for the lives of the faithful. Still, there are times when the Church must witness against the activities of political leaders and rulers of this age. Obviously, Saint Paul endeavored to have Christians pray for the political authorities of his day (which we still do) and to be a force for good in such societies. However, when the political authority of a place was hostile to the Church, as in times of persecution, the Church could and did resist. This is the long legacy of the Christian martyrs both in ages past and in our own time.

As the most visible representatives of the Church, the clergy have a general responsibility to stand for and witness to the highest ideals of the Church. Certainly they are not always successful in this, being human. Yet by standing apart from the political authority of the lands in which they dwell, the chances for the compromise of those ideals is reduced if not entirely eliminated.

Huckabee explained his decision in a most excellent fashion, if not somewhat self-serving at times, such as when he noted his standing in the polls. Noting the pressure from numerous quarters to make a bid for the presidency, he referred to the need to search out his heart, and this in relationship to his Lord Jesus Christ. Despite the urging of supporters and family, and despite a good chance to succeed (at the least, to succeed in obtaining his party’s nomination), in his heart he knew this was not the proper venue for his activity and witness to those principles and ideals he holds dear.

Obviously, a Christian can and has served in the office of President (we have not had—technically—a non-Christian President), and I don’t believe Huckabee believes that serving this office is totally incompatible with Christian faith. Yet perhaps he realized that, as a minister, he has a higher calling, and that, unlike being the Governor of Arkansas, the President routinely must make decisions that might require a compromise of Christian ideals—particularly in the area of national security and defense. As President Carter proved, it is not always to reconcile convictions of faith with the requirements of the office, and it is likely that some of his failings as President stemmed from this inner conflict. This is nothing new. The sainthood of the Emperor Constantine (and several other emperors and empresses) rests on those benefits he brought to the life of the Church; in other areas, Constantine was certainly no saint. His delay of baptism was precisely because in his day there was an idea that there is no repentance after baptism for “mortal” sins (as we might call them today) and, in any event, he would have recognized some basic incongruities between his method of rule and Christian dogma. We do not mention in our hymnology the many persons (including family members) Constantine had executed or murdered.

As a specifically Baptist minister, Huckabee likely has some views on social and national policies that differ from those of the Orthodox tradition even in areas where such views are close if not outwardly identical. From the Protestant tradition, especially in the United States, “ministers” have routinely sought and served in public office. In many ways, Protestantism generally has identified—far more than the Roman Catholic, Orthodox Christian and non-Christian traditions—with and helped shape American “civil religion.”

Nonetheless, in this age of self-promoting ambition, for someone who has as good a chance at winning election to the highest office in the land to decline as a matter of conscience is a most admirable trait. Finally, I have found a candidate worth voting for—the person who does not feel worthy or capable of fulfilling the requirements of office.

The Victory of Death?

2011-05-02T10:15:00.000-05:00

There is little doubt that the locating and ultimate killing of Usama bin Laden will have a negative effect on his terrorist organization in the long run, though in the short term it may be the catalyst for attempted reprisals. Many years ago, well before 9/11/2001, as the head of Al Queda, he declared war on the United States and sought to kill innocent persons throughout the world for his cause. His death is a casualty of war, and a battle-victory for U.S. forces who have struggled over many years to defend our nation in a virtual war against radical Islamic terrorism. To this extent, their success in their mission to keep us safe should be appreciated by a grateful nation (not that we always act as one!).

Disturbing, however, was the apparent jubilation of many Americans upon receiving the news that this mass murderer had been killed. It is disturbing for numerous reasons. In no particular order, these include:

1. Unlike V.E. Day in 1945, this single event was not the end of a war, but one battle in a conflict that will last, still, for many years. The radical agenda espoused by bin Laden did not die with him, and Al Queda was never the organization many Americans might perceive it to be. It was and remains an “umbrella” organization for numerous other autonomous or semi-autnomous subsidiaries and affiliated groups around the world. At the end of wars, the relief of persons and their expression of joy and victory is understandable; this was no end to a war, a war that continue with Americans remaining in the field, in harm’s way. Cutting off the head of the organism that is radical Islamist terrorism does not kill the beast. It is not a snake, but a worm, and its segments can survive and re-grow when one segment is separated.

2. The death of bin Laden by no means brings justice for his victims. A bullet to the head in the middle of the night resulting in the death of one man by no means “balances” the death and suffering that man inflicted directly or indirectly on the world. This was not in the service of justice, but rather of vengeance, and the two are not identical. However his death serves the national security interests of our nation (and that of others), this was neither an “eye for an eye” (it was only, in such a perspective, two eyes for many thousands of eyes) nor compensation. At most there is only the satisfaction that he will no longer practice what he preached and command others to stain their hands in the service of his will.

3. Just a week after Pascha, many Christians are apparently celebrating the death of a human being, inhuman as he may have been. A week ago, we celebrated the triumph of life over death, today many celebrate the triumph resulting in death. Death, so Christians believe and as stated in Holy Scripture, is our enemy. Every death is, in some manner, a tragedy and, in any analysis, a consequence of sin in the world. It is never something to celebrate.

4. One commentator noted that today bin Laden “burns in hell.” That seemed to provide some satisfaction to the commentator. I think that if we are glad someone is in hell, we are probably spending too much time there ourselves.

Death is the enemy, and its manifestation should always be, at best, bitter. This is why our triumphant hymn at Pascha only notes that death has been trampled down—there is no joy at Judas’ suicide, there is no boasting of Pilate’s ultimate demise (and, legendary as it may be) and suicide or death. Jesus does not rise to smite those who crucified him.

And there should be no joy in the death of bin Laden, even if it makes the world a safer place and we can appreciate the efforts of our fellow citizens to make it safer. Enjoying death, even the death of one despicable, means that we truly do not appreciate that…

Christ is risen!

"O Sun and the Moon, the stars of the heavens: Praise the Lord"

2011-04-26T15:18:00.000-05:00

Christ is Risen! Truly He is Risen!

In the ancient world, astronomy was often tied to religion, and for that reason the ancients were often very astute observers of the stars and planets. Already four hundred years before Christ, Meton of Athens had developed detailed computations to reconcile the solar and lunar phases, to predict the new moon on any given date years in advance, and for a long while his calculations were rather accurate.

Reconciling the solar calendar with the lunar is rather complicated. In ancient Israel, the Passover was always begun on the evening of 14 Nisan (or Aviv, the earlier name for the same month). As the date began with sundown, this was actually considered 15 Nisan. Because this was the first month of the Jewish religious, or “festal,” calendar, and months always began with a new moon, 14 Nisan was always a full moon.

Early on, it is most likely that the Israelites relied on observation to “reset” their calendars most years. Passover could only follow the ripening of the barley crop (traditionally the sign of the onset of Spring in conjunction with the vernal equinox). So once that occurred, the next new moon would mark the beginning of the month of Nisan/Aviv. Fourteen days later, the full moon would mark the beginning of preparations for Passover.

Of course, reliance on observation can be risky due to bad weather obscuring observation of the moon. Being able to predict it well into the future was more convenient, and by the time of Christ, such predictions—similar to Meton of Athens’ computations—were in use among the Jews. The problem with such predictions is that sometimes—before the days of complex mathematical algorithms and computers—there were slight errors. Likewise, reliance on the lunar calendar, the solar calendar (for the vernal equinox) required a more subtle computation than was really possible in ancient times. While the ancients did know that the solar year was approximately 365.25 days long (by observing the rotation of the stars as well as the seasons), and they did know the approximate length of the lunar “year” (12 complete cycles of the moon’s phases) was about 354 days, they did not account for the tiny fractions that these were off. They were also aware that the time between the vernal equinoxes was slightly longer that one year, but only sometimes; yet they did not know this was because the earth wobbles slightly on its axis as it orbits the sun. So while their predicitions were usually right, every now and then it might be off by a day or two.

In Jerusalem, they probably waited to confirm the prediction by observation (when possible), but beyond Judea things were again more complicated. Some Jewish communities used different calendars and, if they waited to observe the full moon, it might actually appear full on a day different than in Jerusalem depending on where they were on earth, since the full moon relies on a certain angle of the sun, moon and observer; the higher or lower latitude, the moon might appear slightly different. Finally, if the calendars were different, one might “lag” over time from others due to slight differences in the computations of the calculations required to predict things such as the new moon or vernal equinox.

It is actually quite complicated, and we know that even at the time of Christ different Jewish communities might observe Passover on different days.

We don’t know exactly when the Christians began to observe a special annual feast for the Lord’s Passion and Resurrection. The New Testament does not provide any such information, though it does suggest that Christians observed every first day of the week as the “Lord’s Day,” and this must be due to the Resurrection. Likewise, the very earliest Christians—who were Jewish—probably still observed in some manner the Jewish festal holy days. We know that for awhile Peter and John would continue to pray at the temple; Saint Paul refers to Pentecost—fifty days after the Jewish Passover; and there are other similar allusions scattered throughout the New Testament to such observances. Yet an annual celebration of the Lord’s Resurrection is not mentioned.

We might be safe to think that when observing the Jewish holy days the earliest Christians also remembered those events from the ministry of the Lord that revolved around them; they added to the Jewish feasts a Christian meaning. Eventually, this Christian meaning or understanding overshadowed or, perhaps better, “fulfilled” the meaning of the Jewish feasts. The earliest Christian homily on Pascha that we have comes from Melito of Sardis, who observed a special Christian holy day on 14 Nisan: a combined feast of the Lord’s Passion and Resurrection in the middle of the second century (circa 160). Melito suggests that this was an established tradition, though this is not certain. What is certain is that many Christians came to celebrate the Lord’s Passion and Resurrection on a day that basically coincided with Jewish Passover.

This made sense. There was an historical continuity with the Passion of Jesus who, himself, was a Jew and was crucified on the day that the Passover Lambs were sacrificed. So the early Christians simply chose the Jewish Passover (Pesach in Hebrew) as the day of a Christian Passover (Pascha in Greek is the “translation” of Pesach).

Soon, it is apparent that some Christians waited to celebrate the Lord’s Resurrection on the Sunday after Jewish Passover. We know this because they debated with those who observed it on 14 Nisan. The latter group were called, from the Latin for “14”, Quartodecimens. Soon, those who celebrated the Resurrection on the Sunday after Passover felt it was wrong to celebrate it on Passover—this also made sense, since Jesus rose on the first day of the week and this, at the time, was the day after Passover. Eventually, the date of celebrating a “Christian Pascha” became a point of contention.

While the details of the quarrel are interesting, they are not all that important. By the beginning of the fourth century, perhaps at the Council of Nicea convened by the Emperor Saint Constantine in 325 A.D., the Church decided that the Lord’s Resurrection should be observed by all Christians on Sunday. It also appears, but is not absolutely certain (we do not have the official minutes), that this first of the Ecumenical Councils decided that the Christian Passover, Pascha, should be observed without regard to the timing of the Jewish Passover of their day; at least this is what Saint Constantine wrote in an official letter to those bishops who could not attend the meeting.

This “rule” has been misunderstood over the centuries. It requires explanation:

1. The Council did not remove the notion of Passover from the Christian Pascha; the Gospel of John makes it clear that the Passion and Resurrection of Christ is a fulfillment of the Old Testament Exodus event, which included the first Passover. The fact that the Church continues to refer to the annual observance of this feast as Pascha makes this also obvious.

2. The Council decided that the Christian Pascha would be observed on the first Sunday following the first full moon on or after the vernal equinox.

3. The Council did not prescribe that the Christian Pascha must always follow the Jewish Passover; this was a common understanding that developed later and continues to our own day, but is actually not technically correct. What the Council did prescribe was that the Church should not rely on the Jewish computations or predictions for the date of Pascha. This is because by the fourth century, it was thought that the Jews were often in error regarding the prediction of the full moon and/or different Jewish communities might celebrate Passover on different days. This is what Saint Constantine apparently meant when he told the absent bishops that the Jews sometimes celebrate Passover “twice in one year.”

4. In practice, the Church sought to maintain a “proper” and “accurate” prediction of Passover according to what the Church thought was the biblical rule (first full moon after the vernal equinox = 14 Nisan on the Jewish calendar). By following this basic rule, the supposed “confusion” of the Jews of the day as to the proper date would be avoided, while still maintaining a historical and “cosmic” continuity with the biblical Passover. I will return to this point below, but for now one more point is necessary.

5. Over the centuries, the Jews have used several different methods of calculating and predicting the date of Passover. The Church basically said it would no longer pay any attention to what the Jews thought about the date, the Church would figure it out for itself. So if the Jews decided Passover would actually fall before, on, or after the Church’s Pascha, this was irrelevant to the Church. However, under the Julian calendar today, the calendar Orthodox Christians use, the Jewish Passover will fall before Orthodox Pascha every year the Jews and the Orthodox continue to use their same methods for calculating their dates. This led a renowned canonical lawyer of the Byzantine era to note that if the Orthodox calculate correctly, Christian Pascha should always follow the Jewish Passover. He did not say, as is commonly but erroneously supposed, that it must follow Jewish Passover. That it will does not change the fact that if the Jews decided to delay it or change their computations so that their Passover would follow Orthodox Pascha, we still would not need to change a thing. In fact, the Jews have changed their computational methods over the centuries, and it has had no effect on the Churches whatsoever.

Now by “historical continuity,” I mean that the Church was maintaining a connection to the Gospel accounts of Christ being crucified just before Passover and rising on the “first day of the week” just after Passover.

By “cosmic,” I mean something a little more complicated.

Many festal observances of the Church and even in the Jewish tradition are tied to specific “dates” on a calendar. The problem is that the Jewish calendar “adjusts” every now and then due to the adjustment for the phases of the moon. So while Passover for the Jews always begins at sundown of 14 Nisan/Aviv, this date does not consistently correspond with a date on the civil calendar everyone else uses (this is as true today as it was in the fourth century). Yet the Jews did not “adjust” their calendar simply to be difficult and complicated, but because they tied their calendar to “cosmic” realities (the phases of the moon, the cycle of the sun and rotation of the stars, the change of seasons and the ripening of the crops). They did so in recognition of the fact that these “cycles” and phases were ordained by God, the Creator of Heaven and Earth. It was likewise God who set the sun and moon “to mark the seasons.” According to Exodus, the timing of the first Passover and the Exodus was determined by God, and the timing of its annual commemoration was likewise ordained by God as a command of the Law. That this incorporated a lunar-solar calendar appears obvious, since this was the calendar in use by the Israelites at the time. So if Passover is the day after the full moon that falls on or after the vernal equinox, this is God’s will, not a time of convenience chosen by man. Thus, there is in some sense an attempt to observe Pascha not simply on the same “date” every year (even if it is on the Jewish calendar), but according to the “season” chosen by God, connected to the very motion of the universe God created. If this is a bit inconvenient, so be it.

The problem is that the ancient Romans and Greeks, the Byzantines and contemporary societies generally use a solar calendar. April 3 each year does not “fall” on the same phase of the moon; some years the moon will be full, in others it will not be.

The Roman Calendar (and our subsequent calendars based on it) basically set the date of the vernal equinox on what we call today March 21 (actually from sundown March 20 to sundown March 21). The problem with the Roman or “Julian” Calendar (named for Julius Caesar who corrected some obvious errors in the previous calendars and standardized such things as leap years) is that it is not perfectly aligned to the orbit of the earth. It presumes a year that is exactly 365.25 days long, requiring on “leap day” every four years. Unfortunately, the actual solar year is a few minutes less than this. Over time, this results in a “lag” (about 3 days every 400 years, but is not quite regular).

Now the vernal equinox is an observable, astronomical event. Even the ancients knew that it did not always fall on March 20/21, but that it could vary by as much as a day or two. They did not understand why as we do today. Nonetheless, March 21 was kept as the “official” date of the vernal equinox by the Church when predicting the full moon. Nobody paid much attention for several hundreds of years if the vernal equinox was off a day or two—in most years the full moon fell on a date sufficiently after March 21 that it did not make a real difference anyway.

But things got more complicated. Around the fifteenth century, it is reported that Byzantine (Orthodox) astronomers noticed that the Julian calendar was a bit off, and that March 20/21 was no longer the time of the vernal equinox. They also recognized that the method of predicting the full moon was becoming increasingly off the mark (this is due to the irregularity of the moon’s orbit around the earth compared to the solar year). The way they noticed this was rather simple: they looked up at the sky! But around the same time, the Byzantines had bigger problems on their hands: a diminishing empire due to the Ottoman Turkish incursions. So the calendar issue was set aside. Furthermore, it was not really a big issue to begin with, since by that time the rule was really interpreted (correctly) as prioritizing the unity of the Christian observance—that all Christians should observe Pascha at the same time. As this was the case, astronomical variability was a secondary and minor problem that was eventually ignored in light of the need to survice the Ottoman conquest.

In 1582, Pope Gregory XIII of Rome visited the observatory that was built in his summer palace. It was built so that astronomers could prove to him that the Julian calendar—in use for about seventeen centuries by that time—was way off the mark. They proved to him that the vernal equinox was, by 1582, regularly falling on or around March 11, not March 21 (the official date). This meant, supposedly, that they were in violation of the rule set by the First Ecumenical Council of Nicea. By then, every astronomer already knew the problems with the Julian calendar, and they proposed a change that Pope Gregory accepted, producing the “Gregorian Calendar,” the calendar that we use to this day for civil purposes.

Pope Gregory, in October, 1582, eliminated 10 days. October 4 was followed by October 15. He also adopted a new method for accounting for leap years to account for the 3 day “lag” every 400 years. The rule we still follow today: one extra day in the year every year evenly divided by 4, except century years unless the century year is evenly divisible by 400. Thus, 1900 was not a leap year, but 2000 was; 2100 will not be. This calendar, it is well known, would be as astronomically accurate as possible (March 21 being the vernal equinox even though the wobble of the earth does make it vary by a day or two every so often, but the wobble is not really predictable, and the rotation of the earth is gradually slowing). That is, it will be astronomically accurate until 4099. In 4100, if not adjusted, it will be in reality one day off. But the fact is, Pope Gregory’s mathematicians produced a calendar accurate for 2517 years, a great improvement!

Another thing that the Gregorian calendar sought to improve was the calculation of the full moon. By 1582, the prediction and the actual date was always a few days off, and this could affect when Pascha fell, so the old system of prediction which “lost” a day from the actual full moon every 300 or so years was modified. Every 300 years, the computational “table” (predicting the full moon on or after March 21 for 19 consecutive years) would be adjusted by a day (or so). This also resulted in a prediction as accurate as possible at the time before computers, Geo-positioning satellites, and space-based telescopes, though it was not perfect. Once or twice every nineteen or so years, the date of Pascha would actually fall one week later than the “true” Sunday after the first full moon after the vernal equinox.

Now the Gregorian calendar was not a big hit outside of Rome, and it took a few hundred years for the world to completely adopt it. The Pope asked the Orthodox to consider it, but mainly for polemical reasons the Orthodox rejected it (they were not on very friendly terms at the time and most of the Orthodox lived under governments hostile to Christianty so survival and consistency was more important than accuracy).

To this day, the Orthodox continue to reckon the date of Pascha using the Julian calendar with its astronomical flaws. The Protestants and Anglicans/Episcopalians eventually adopted the Gregorian method.

Truth is, the Gregorian is more accurate to the “cosmic” date as it was figured in the fourth century. Eventually, the Julian calendar will “lose” more and more days (today, it is 13 days off the astronomical vernal equinox or March 21 on the Gregorian calendar; in 1582 it was only 10) and in the very distant future, our Orthodox Pascha will be celebrated while everyone else is celebrating Christmas. The Orthodox who use the “New Calendar” might celebrate both feasts on the same day!

Actually, this will not happen. In 1922, the Orthodox considered changing the date, but the meeting was mishandled, and the computations for Pascha were not changed. However, many Orthodox Churches did switch to a “modified Julian Calendar” or “New” calendar for all other dates. This “New” calendar is basically identical with the Gregorian until the year 2800, when it will also fall one day behind. Nonetheless, this is why some Orthodox celebrate Christmas on December 25 with every other Christian tradition, and some Orthodox celebrate Christmas on December 25 while the rest of the world marks January 7 on the calendar.

The truth is that neither the Gregorian or the Julian calendars accurately predict the date of Pascha 100% of the time. When our dates fall together, both dates are astronomically accurate (falling early in the cycle for the Orthodox, late in the cycle for the West). When they fall apart, the West is usually astronomically accurate, but not always. In 2017, just six years from now, the West will be one week late, and the Orthodox even later.

Today, scientists have the capability to predict the vernal equinox and the full moon on or after it (and, obviously, the Sunday after that!) with pinpoint accuracy. Perhaps in recognition of this, both the East and West will return to the intention of the Council of Nicea—since the Orthodox especially claim fidelity to the faith of the Fathers—and change their reckoning based on sound and accurate science. This is, after all, what the Byzantines did at least by 380 A.D. when they adopted the Alexandrian predictions based on the best available astronomical data of the time.

If both East and West changed to a scientifically based system, the East would not have to think of it as a “capitulation” to Rome, and Rome would not be able to claim infallibility on the calendar issue.

Such an attempt at this was made in 1999, sponsored by the World Council of Churches. Yet the Orthodox have so many issues with that body that the discussions were almost doomed at the start, and they came to nothing. Yet inevitably the Orthodox will have to do something, because by 2800, the difference will be so great as to be noticeable. By 4000 or so, Pascha will come in the Summer, not the Spring (in the northern Hemisphere, anyway).

That would be a huge deviation from the biblical foundations of the Lord’s Passover. If we all just looked up at the moon and sun now and then (or let astronomers do so) as the Jews did of old, then we would be faithful to the historical and cosmic meaning of Pascha in all details.

Until the time we choose to be astronomically correct, the Orthodox will maintain their present custom so that the primary motive of the Council at Nicea can be maintained: that the communion of the Church celebrates Pascha together, the Queen of Feasts, the Festival of Festivals, the triumph over the power of death and the recreation of the world.

Christ is Risen!

Hades., Hell and the Vanquishing of Death

2011-03-21T16:11:00.000-05:00

Did Jesus go to Hell? Yes and no, depending on what is meant by the word hell.

Sometimes, contemporary Christians have difficulty understanding basic teachings of the Church as found in Holy Scripture due to linguistic problems. One such example is the notion that Jesus Christ, following His death on the Cross, descended into Hades or, in some English translations, Hell. The descent into Hades or, as it is commonly known in Western Christian traditions, the “harrowing of Hell,” is a long-standing and rather standard teaching of the Church from the most ancient times. However, when contemporary Christians think of Hell, they think of that place of everlasting torment, the realm of the unrighteous consigned to suffer for eternity; a place of fire and the “gnashing of teeth.” It is therefore difficult to understand how or why Jesus would have gone there.

In fact, Jesus did not go to Hell in this sense of the word, as a place of torment and condemnation, but He did go to Hell in another sense of the word: an older, more technically correct sense of the word Hell.

Originally, the English word Hell was basically synonymous with the Greek word Hades and the Hebrew Sheol. The Hebrew Sheol appears in the Hebrew Scriptures, our Old Testament, to denote the realm of the dead, where all persons went after death. In this respect, Sheol was basically “neutral.” While the origins of the word are unknown, Sheol was a place under the earth or underground (the “underworld” in a literal sense), and is often used in the sense of a “pit” or the “abyss”; in any case, it is to Sheol that the dead go. Note that this association of the “underworld” and the dead probably arose because of the custom of burial in the ground. However, it is also not at all clear that the ancient Hebrews believed in an afterlife in the manner we do today, and even in Jesus’ day, the Pharisees accepted a “resurrection” of the dead while the Sadducees did not—the dead simply existed no more.

When the Hebrew Scriptures were translated into Greek, the word Sheol was often translated by the Greek Hades. Hades was a place-name from mythology, being also a place for all the dead under the earth or, at least, in a “hidden” place. In the mythology, of course, it is likened to a prison from which none can escape. The etymology of the word Hades literally means “not seen.” So Hades and Sheol corresponded to each other rather closely, and this is probably why the early translators chose to use the Greek term.

As an aside, in the Greek mythology, the place called Tartaros was even deeper underground than Hades, and was, in fact, not just a prison but a place of punishment. Tartarus appears in this context in the New Testament at 2 Peter 2:4. Again, however, Hades and Tartarus are not really the same “place,” but symbolic images for two different ideas.

When the Holy Scriptures were translated into English, the translators were not always consistent. Sometimes they translated Sheol as “pit,” or simply transcribed it as Sheol. However, Old English also had a word that basically meant “hidden” from Anglo-Saxon helen, itself from a Proto-Germanic word meaning to hide something, and this corresponded well to the etymology of Hades (“not seen”). Furthermore, Norse mythology had a goddess named Hel who ruled a place by the same name under the world where dead women (and some men) would go after death. So “Hell” became a common word in the King James (or “Authorized”) Version of the English Bible. It simply meant the place where the dead go, and was equivalent to Sheol and Hades. But…

The King James Version, perhaps because of Christian associations by the time, also translated other Greek words in the New Testament with the word “hell”: the Greek Gehenna and Tartaros. So the English “Hell” came to be used for three different Greek words (Hades, Gehenna, Tartaros) which are not the same places at all in the Greek, much less Hebrew.

When Jesus mentions Gehenna in the Gospels, he is referring to a real place, but using it in a symbolic way. In His day, the place called (in Hebrew) Ge-hinnom was a valley just outside Jerusalem, essentially a place used as a garbage dump, where refuse would be burned. It is well known in the Old Testament as the “Valley of the Son of Hinnom” (see Joshua 15:8; 2 Chronicles 28:3; 33:6; Jeremiah 7:31; 19:2-6), and it is recorded that in this valley would occur the burnt sacrifices of children to the pagan god Moloch and where apostate Israelites worshipped Canaanite deities. So by the time of Jesus, Gehenna had a rather nasty reputation (good for nothing but a dump), and his use of the place as a metaphor for a place of eternal torment and suffering is well documented (in fact, other rabbis would also use this imagery in a similar manner). By the way, the valley is still there, right outside the Old City of Jerusalem. It is today a rather pretty park.

But Gehenna is not the same “place” as Hades in the New Testament. And this is most important, for when Jesus “descends into Hades” and destroys its dominion, this means that He actually dies in the flesh (in other words, He really died) and rises from the dead. He does not go to the place of eternal torment (Gehenna or Tartaros), but rather to the realm where all the dead before Him had gone. This need not be taken literally in terms of a “geographic” locality. Essentially, “descending into Hades” means Jesus was buried.

Thus, the phrase “descending into Hades” is a poetic way to say that Jesus died and “went” to the realm of the dead. Saint Paul refers to this in similar terms at Ephesians 4: 7-10 (NKJV):

But to each one of us grace was given according to the measure of Christ’s gift. Therefore He says: “ When He ascended on high, He led captivity captive, and gave gifts to men.” (Now this, “He ascended”—what does it mean but that He also first descended into the lower parts of the earth? He who descended is also the One who ascended far above all the heavens, that He might fill all things.)

This imagery of the “lower parts of the earth” corresponds in nearly every way to the Greek concept of Hades and the Hebrew Sheol. It also corresponds to the original meaning of the term Hell.

This imagery of Christ “descending” into the lower parts of the earth, Hades, Sheol, developed in the hymnology of the Church and various doctrinal statements. For example, in the Latin West, around the 6^th century, the “Athanasian Creed” states about Jesus,

Qui passus est pro salute nostra: descendit ad inferos: tertia die resurrexit a mortuis. (literally, “Who suffered for our salvation; descended the lower place; rose on the third day from the dead.”)

A similar phrase in the Latin of the Apostles’ Creed (4^th century), also of the Western Church, appears as well. Most people translated the Latin inferos into English as “hell.” However, the Latin word actually means the “lower place,” or “beneath,” and in this context, “under the ground” or “beneath the ground” (compare the English “inferior” meaning “lower”). This corresponds rather well to Saint Paul’s use of the “lower parts of the earth” (Greek: ta katotera tis yis) at Ephesians 4 (see above), and the ancient creedal statements did prefer to use scriptural language; the Latin here seems to be a loose adaptation of the Ephesians text.

To be clear, when Jesus died, He descended to Hades/Sheol/the “lower parts”/the realm of the dead, and not Gehenna or Tartaros.

This is rather important, for the imagery of Gehenna, the burning that never stops, the outer darkness, the “lake of fire” and other images Christ Jesus uses to describe everlasting torment for the unrighteous and damned, is a matter following the Last Judgment (see the many references to Gehenna—in the Greek text—at Matthew 5:22, 29-30; 10:28; 18:9; 23:15, 33; Mark 9:43-47; Luke 12:5; James 3:6). Jesus never actually mentions Tartarus at all, and only mentions Hades rarely: that its gates will not stand against the power of His Church (see Matthew 16:18). In fact, this passage makes no sense if Jesus had in mind the final judgment and the place of eternal torment. It is death that cannot prevail against the Church, and the faithful of the Church would not be in everlasting torment!

As the King James Version and most standard English versions (including the New King James Version, the version used by the Orthodox Study Bible) translate Gehenna and Tartaros as “hell.” So it is probably better to not use the word Hell to refer to Hades.

As for Jesus visiting the dead from ages past, the New Testament makes reference to Jesus going to those who died and preaching to them. This would make no sense if the final sentence had been passed. Saint Peter writes (1 Peter 3: 18-19):

For Christ also suffered once for sins, the just for the unjust, that He might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh but made alive by the Spirit, by whom also He went and preached to the spirits in prison,…

Saint Paul and Saint Peter in his first letter may both have been influenced in their writing by imagery from the Old Testament, such as Isaiah 24, which refers to prisoners in a pit who, after many days, will be visited. The visitor mentioned by the Prophet, according to this reading, would be the Messiah, the Christ, while the prisoners would be the dead from ages past.

Of course, there is some ambiguity caused by the second letter of Saint Peter when he mentions those imprisoned and their being punished until the final judgement. At 2 Peter 2:4 however, the Greek term is not the more “neutral” Hades, but the more specific place of punishment: Tartaros, and Jesus does not visit these prisoners—the angels who sinned (demons).

Yet the New Testament also allows us to prove that Hades and Death are vanquished by Christ’s Resurrection, even though “Hell” in the sense of the “fire” and torment, will continue. At Revelation 20:11-15, we are told that Hades and Death give up the dead, and they (symbolically personified here) are themselves thrown into the “lake of fire” to where all those who are not enrolled in the “Book of Life” are also thrown. This is a rather gruesome image recalling a passage from the Prophet Isaiah (14) to which the Paschal Homily attributed to Saint John Chrysostom points in quoting the Prophet:

Let no one fear death, for the Savior's death has set us free.

He that was taken by death has annihilated it!

He descended into Hades and took Hades captive!

He embittered it when it tasted his flesh! And anticipating this Isaiah exclaimed: "Hades was embittered when it encountered you in the lower regions".

This is reference to the Greek version (Septuagint) of Isaiah 14:9. The Hebrew text reads “moved” or “stirred up” or “excited” in the place of the Greek reading “embittered,” and in most English versions (based on the King James Version), the Hebrew Sheol is rendered “Hell.” In any event, Hades/Hell is forced to “give up” the dead in this passage, lending itself to a Christian interpretation consistent with the Resurrection of Christ.

Thus, the “harrowing of hell” or the Descent into Hades, does have ample scriptural support, in both the Old and New Testament (there is more than I have mentioned here as well), since it means that upon death, Jesus “descends” to the realm of the dead where He announces the Gospel, the Good News of Resurrection, to those long dead. Rising from the dead, he destroys the dominion of death. This imagery appears quite often in the hymnology of Pascha and each and every Sunday throughout the year.

However, to be clear: the Church quite often sings or speaks of Jesus descending into Hades to vanquish the dominion of death for our salvation, but it never, ever uses the more “fearsome” images of Gehenna or Tartaros to describe this “place” in connection with Jesus.

This event actually comprises the scene of the icon most associated with the Resurrection of Christ in the Orthodox Christian Tradition: the “Descent into Hades.” Jesus is portrayed in upwards movement with the gates of Hades beneath his feet, lifting up Adam and Eve and surrounded by Old Testament figures (most often Kings David and Solomon together with prophets). Sometimes death is personified under the broken gates of Hades as an old, withered man.

The reason this is the iconic portrayal for the Resurrection is for two reasons. First, the actual Resurrection of the Savior was not witnessed by anyone; the tomb was discovered empty. There can be no depiction of that “event” since it was not seen. Second, the “Descent into Hades” can be depicted because it was “seen” by those in Hades (though not by anyone outside Hades); it was also described in Holy Scripture, and the icon itself affirms what the Church has always confessed: that Christ truly died on the Cross, was buried, and on the third day rose from the dead. Likewise, it is His rising from the dead that conquers death’s dominion for all humanity, those presently alive and those who preceded Jesus in death.

The descent into Hades and the preaching to those there means nothing more nor less than the fact that Christ’s death and Resurrection were for humanity in its entirety, and that all persons before Christ were made aware of the awesome victory.

So in the end, when speaking of our Lord’s actions, death and Resurrection, I prefer to speak of “Hades” rather than “Hell.” In our everyday speech and in the popular imagination, “Hell” has become almost, if not actually, identical to the imagery of Gehenna, Tartaros, and the realm of the devil. It would be most improper to speak of our Lord in Hell if used in this sense. This would be the place of the final condemnation. Better yet, since it is imprecise to speak of these realities as literal “places” in our spatial sense of reality, Hell should be reserved for the state and manner of one’s final existence in opposition to God; something that for us on earth is yet to be determined.

Likewise, it is improper to presume that Gehenna, Hades and Tartaros are meant literally in the Bible. Gehenna was and is an actual site in Jerusalem, and nobody is burning there now. Jesus was speaking symboloically and metaphorically. The same is obviously true with the Greek mythological locations of Hades and Tartarus. These were easily understood references to describe a reality (and the future judgment with the possibility of condemnation is a reality!) that cannot be easily described, and so the New Testament authors found images that people could readily understand.

Japan

2011-03-17T14:21:00.000-05:00

Our hearts go out to the people of Japan who continue to suffer from an unusual, even strange collusion of catastrophes, each of which would be sufficient of itself to be a major disaster: the 8.9 magnitude earthquake with dozens of aftershocks that have been strong enough themselves to be major earthquakes; the tsunami and the devastation it has wrought on the northeastern Japanese coast and up to seven miles inland; and the nuclear disaster caused by the cascade of disasters and which shows no signs of being contained as of this writing.

Likewise, while many Orthodox are not even aware of it, the autonomous Orthodox Christian Church of Japan has a diocese (Sendai) that was at the focal point of these disasters. While Bishop Serafim of the diocese and most of the faithful are accounted for, there are Orthodox brethren still missing, including one of the five priests serving the diocese. Many of the churches are damaged or lost. Special prayers should be offered for this small, struggling Orthodox community under Archbishop Daniel.

A decade ago, our nation was sent into shock on September 11, and it took some time to recover. Yet in context, what the Japanese are now dealing with dwarfs 9-11 in scale, with already several thousand confirmed dead and many more thousands unaccounted or still missing. And indeed, many Americans were transfixed a decade ago because much of that tragic terrorist attack and its aftermath was actually witnessed through television and video, much of it live. Yet many of us were not directly affected by anything but the pictures—horrific as many were—and a relatively short break in our transportation options or the lingering security measures set in place following those days. In Japan, already the entire country is suffering from a lack of electricity (in the winter), fears of radioactivity, not to mention the grief for so many lost, and for so much lost. This event has affected and will continue to affect Japan for years to come in a manner that 9-11 never affected us—and that is rather scary.

A parishioner inquired as to whether these events can be considered “signs of the end” as mentioned in the prophecies of the Gospels and Revelation. Certainly so, for such signs have been manifest since our Lord spoke them. Yet such signs are not necessarily and individually markers of some cosmic “schedule” for the end. Such signs “in the sun and moon and stars,” with the torrents of the seas and the quaking of the earth, have always been signs that this world has been touched by the corruption of sin from the time of the ancestral fall from Paradise. Unlike some nutty evangelical commentators on television, these signs are not punishments or the acts of a wrathful God, but signs that this world is “passing away.”

As we continue on our Lenten journey, we should all be aware that the sufferings of the world are to be our own—not as something imposed upon us by cruel exterior forces, but as a voluntary “picking up of our Cross” so that, in faith, hope and love, we may respond to the needs of all those suffering. “Sympathy” literally means, “suffer together.” As the Japanese (and countless persons all around the world) are suffering involuntarily, we are called to “participate” by our own sacrifices large and small to assist them and alleviate the ills they have, to this point, so patiently endured. This is why Lent is a time of almsgiving and repentance: to turn away from the impulses that normally move us, so that we may rather control them in prudence, patience and love for the benefit of others. So by all means, give alms as they are needed of us, as so much is required of us. It is time for the Kingdom of the Son to reach out to the Empire of the Sun.

Orthodox Unity in America and the OCA

2011-03-04T15:01:00.000-06:00

March 3, 2011

Recent press releases and Internet postings from His Eminence Metropolitan Jonah and the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church in America (OCA) reveal that, at best, there is again trouble in the administration and governance of that Orthodox jurisdiction. This includes the conflicting or, at best, unclear accounts of the change in the position of the OCA Chancellor; a debate as to whether the “leave of absence” or “personal time” of the primate (Metropolitan Jonah) was “requested” or imposed; not to mention the public release of the minutes of a recent synodal meeting of the OCA that seem to contradict—in part—a recent speech of Metropolitan Jonah’s released on the OCA website. This all comes relatively soon during what was supposed to be a period of “recovery” following an extended period of troubles for the OCA: the replacement of two primates in short order, largely due to perceptions of corruption or improper use of authority; the resignation/removal of a diocesan bishop in Alaska following various accusations; an investigation into the finances of a monastic/seminary institution; the repose of Archbishop Job of the Midwest; and a criminal investigation of another diocesan bishop in Canada. Unfortunately, as we enter into the season of Great Lent, the OCA is certainly—as a whole—not in a peaceful state.

For many years now, persons from various Orthodox jurisdictions of the United States and Orthodox lay organizations such as Orthodox Christian Laity (I would use the term para-ecclesial since it is accurate as the group has no formal endorsement from any specific Orthodox jurisdiction, SCOBA or the new Episcopal Assembly—but they seem to be offended by the term) have routinely criticized the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America and the Ecumenical Patriarchate as being the primary obstacles to Orthodox unity in the Americas, the United States in particular. The charge is somewhat unfair and non-credible, at least in light of the instability we currently find among other Orthodox groups.

Since the tenure of Archbishop (and later, Ecumenical Patriarch) Athenagoras, the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese (GOA) has been relatively stable in its administration and governance. This does not neglect the real problems and crises encountered over the decades. Even the debacle surrounding the tenure of Archbishop Spyridon, which potentially could have divided the Archdiocese and presented a real crisis in governance, did not—in the end—substantially impact the GOA in any lasting, negative manner. Interestingly, there seem to be some parallels between that episode in the life of the GOA and the current troubles of the OCA. Nonetheless, other Orthodox groups of the USA have struggled with internal unity in a manner unknown within the GOA. Such internal division is obviously incompatible with unity on a broader scale.

For example, our friends of the Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese are still somewhat confused about the difference between a diocesan and a titular/assistant bishop, or how assistant bishops (formally subordinate to their Metropolitan) can still constitute an authentic “Holy Synod” which the canonical tradition posits as being comprised of “ruling” bishops. What the Antiochians claimed they recently received, autonomy from the Patriarchate of Antioch, was really no more autonomy than the GOA has enjoyed since 1979 with its Archdiocese-Dioceses (now Metropolises) structure. What they actually received was more assistant/titular bishops who have no canonical rights to the dioceses to which they have been assigned, a situation the GOA experienced prior to 1979.

Next, though OCA clergy and laypersons frequently point to the “non-canonical” arrangement of Orthodox in the USA along “ethnic” jurisdictions (the GOA being, by far, the largest one), it remains a fact that within the OCA there are still “dioceses” that are organized on nothing more than ethnic lines (the Romanian Episcopate, the Bulgarian and Albanian dioceses, etc.). This does not even account for the fact that the Moscow Patriarchate, which granted “autocephaly” to the OCA in 1971, still maintains its own “jurisdiction” in the USA, and has recently healed a long schism with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (outside Russia) which also has dioceses in the USA. This writer rarely hears any criticism of that anomaly. The OCA’s Romanian Episcopate is in dialogue regarding a possible reunion with the Romanian Archdiocese in the USA that remains under the jurisdiction of the Romanian Patriarchate, and ostensibly could “leave” the jurisdiction of the OCA—unlikely though that might be.

One of the statements of Metropolitan Jonah that raised eyebrows outside the OCA (and apparently raised blood pressure within the OCA) was that there was a necessary reconsideration of the OCA’s autocephaly. Metropolitan Jonah has been very friendly with the Moscow Patriarchate and, in light of the structure of the Episcopal Assembly and its work, one gets the impression that Metropolitan Jonah might be considering a rapprochement with Moscow, returning to some sort of autonomous, though no longer strictly autocephalous, arrangement. Obviously, there would be some members of the OCA who would consider this—if true—to be a betrayal.

Outside the OCA, such a move would not be perceived as a betrayal, but rather a step in the right direction to the eventual unification of all Orthodox “jurisdictions” into one administrative and governing body which, eventually, might be an autocephalous Church. That future reality is still a long way away from the present.

Nonetheless, the recent years of turmoil experienced by the OCA proves that the fear-mongering proponents of American Orthodox unity were clearly wrong on some matters.

First, “foreign” interventions in the life of the Church here in the USA are not unique to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Moscow certainly has, and apparently still continues to intervene in some ways, even to the point of apparently “violating” the canonical principle of one city, one bishop, since it maintains (now) two jurisdictions under its authority on American soil that overlap the OCA to which it granted autocephaly. Moscow is not alone. Romania is seeking to strengthen its “ties” to Romanian Orthodox Americans. The Church of Georgia recently established an episcopal see in the United States, though it apparently does not have any real parishes.

Second, the “Turkish-dominated” foreign power of the Ecumenical Patriarchate never effected the dismantlement of the GOA as the new charter was supposed to accomplish, nor did it weaken it. Compared to the “autonomy” of the Antiochian Archdiocese, or the current turmoil of the OCA, the GOA is doing relatively fine.

Third, as the recent experience of the OCA clearly shows—not to mention the experience of others—autocephaly is not always what it is often proposed to be—a panacea for real and difficult problems of unity within the Church.

The real problem of Orthodox unity in the USA and, indeed, elsewhere around the world, is not canonical and administrative unity or uniformity. The answer to the problem of unity is not something that can be dictated by any governing authority. The model in such a proposal is actually reversed. The governance of the Church is, in theory, to arise from the unity of the local Church. Unity within the Church stems from our communion, our “common existence,” and the sharing of “one mind and one heart” so that we may confess the undivided Trinity. Yet even the ecclesiological structure of the local Church has made unity problematic since we have as of yet not comprehended the systemic problem: the local Church, centered by the bishop, is itself too large and unwieldy to foster a real experience of communion (in Greece, some bishops oversee hundreds of parishes; in the GOA each Metropolis/Diocese contains dozens of parishes often scattered over a geographic area far larger than the ancient Patriarchates). This is often true at the level of the “cells” of the local Church, the parish—often so large that parishioners are virtually strangers to each other or, at least, to a large segment of the parish.

Of course, at this point the systemic ecclesiological issues facing the contemporary Church can only be solved with the assistance of the canonical synods that, themselves, manifest the problem. The Episcopal Assembly is one step in the right direction as it will, eventually, provide a blueprint for achieving “administrative” unity in areas where canonical boundaries currently, and wrongly, overlap. Yet that will not, in itself, solve the problem. The OCA and its troubles testify to that.

Enforce But Don't Defend?

2011-02-27T05:33:00.000-06:00

This week, the Department of Justice announced that it would no longer defend the constitutionality of the "Defense of Marriage Act" (DOMA) on behalf of the Obama administration. When questioned, the spokesperson of the Administration announced that the Obama administration would continue, as constitutionally required, to enforce the act.

This double-speak, of course, is analogous to a police officer giving you a speeding ticket --you can pay the ticket, but you really do not have to do so. Just go to court and nobody will contest your innocence.

Of course, the essence of DOMA is that states need not recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states, and this provision of the act is not affected by the announcement of the Department of Justice. What the Department of Justice is not going to defend is the third section of the article which defines, for the purposes of the Federal Government, marriage as only between one man and one woman. So, in essence, the Federal Government will continue to allow states to ignore same-sex marriages recognized in other states, and will continue to enforce the law for the Federal Government until it is repealed or overturned by the courts. Only now the Federal Government will not defend the act in court.

There are over one-thousand regulations of the Federal Government (many of them benefit related) pertaining to married persons. As of today, persons in same-sex marriage are not recognized by the Federal Government as being married in any state in relation to these regualtions/benefits. This is now and will continue to be challenged in the courts. While the Department of Justice will no longer defend the act in court, other parties (including members of Congress) can defend the act, so there will still be a contest of sorts. Eventually the Supreme Court will have to decide whether the Federal Government can, constitutionally, define marriage as only between one woman and one man.

Apparently the President does not think it can under the Constitution, for this would be discriminatory against persons of a sexual orientation (homosexual orientation) in the minority. This is an odd reading of the document and even case law, since the Constitution does not prohibit discrimination in general. It does, or has been interpreted as prohibiting certain types of discrimination. In the past, of course, it did discriminate and continue to discriminate against certain persons for certain reasons. For example, foreign-born immigrants are not permitted to serve as President. That's a type of codified discrimination. The President must be 35 years or older. That is a discrimination against younger persons.

Discrimination is something that occurs all the time in our law, even if we do not refer to it by that word in all cases. What is at issue is whether certain types of discrimination are unfair and infringe or impede fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

This is where President Obam wants to have it both ways. As a candidate, he claimed to believe that marriage was only between a man and a woman. He did believe, reasonably, that same-sex partners should be legal protected by some type of "civil union." As a candidate, he did make some promises to the Gay-Lesibian community to repeal the military's policty of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DOMA and Don't Ask, Don't Tell both being products of the Clinton Administration). The homosexual community generally supported Obama's candidacy in contrast to his opponent, but since has been rather critical of the slow pace by which President Obama has sought to fulfill some of his promises. The President did recently seek to end "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" but its implementation has not been completed and is contingent on some minor technical points still unresolved; it is likely to end. The lack of defense for the third section of DOMA is essentially a pander in the same direction.

It is a pander because Obama, in the two years of clear majorities of his party, did not make any move to clarify his position on same-sex civil unions or marriage. He could have, rather easily, developed legislation for civil unions to be recognized by the Federal Government with same-sex couples qualifying for most, if not all, of the benefits of married persons. Instead, he did not act at all on the issue. Perhaps recognizing the opposition of a majority of Americans to same-sex marriage, he remained silent on the issue until now, when his "non-action" and refusal to defend DOMA has the opportunity of reversing the position of the Federal Government to the present.

Each time that recognition of same-sex marriage has been on a ballot, the American people have voted against it. The only way same-sex marriage has come to be recognized in any state is through judicial activism. This does not, however, correlate with the fact that a majority of Americans are opposed to discrimination against persons of a homosexual orientation. Americans are growing more "tolerant" of such persons in general, while remaining opposed to naming same-sex unions "marriage." A majority of Americans--a supermajority, in fact--prefer to make a distinction between marriage and same-sex civil unions.

So now President Obama places himself in a position to be lauded for his decision to question (and not defend) the constitutionality of DOMA if the SUpreme Court should ultimately overturn it in whole or in part. If the Supreme Court does not overturn it, he is in a position to pander to his liberal constituency and claim the nasty conservatives on the court have once again twarted justice for all. He can also claim that the Republican-controlled House of Representatives would not cooperate with him on legislation to rectify the rights of same-sex couples in light of his much publicized "struggle" with the issue.

He has also placed himself in the position with independent and more conservative voters to claim that he still believes that marriage is only between one man and one woman, and has taken no action to change that despite his much publicized "struggle" with the issue.

Yet it would appear that the real "struggle" the President has is not with marriage's definition or the constitutionality of same-sex marriage. It is a struggle to mask his true beliefs (whatever that may be) on the issue to avoid alienating voters. That is not a struggle with belief, per se, but with hypocrisy.

The Audacity of Hope and Winning the Future (or, Vacuity as the State of the Union)

2011-02-20T13:54:00.000-06:00

It is time to have an adult conversation. We stand together on the precipice of our collective future, for the future is something we all share, even as we stood together in the experience of our past. Already, yesterday the past was gone, and we were present for the present that turned into our future today. Every moment that passes is an opportunity for the present to be transformed into the future, a future that we will win if we allow the present to turn away from the way of the past.

None of us can afford to remain in the past, for if we do we will in no way attain the future, and the only means to progressing to the future is to maintain the present with hope. We hope for the future, remembering the past and conscious of the presence of our present moment. Some would prefer, perhaps, to pass by the present in the past, but this is a path without a future. We cannot remain in the past, for it has passed. Is there a question about whether the past has passed? It is evident, even if not certain: we will never attain the future if we do not pass from the past through the present. Even then, there is a danger that we will not move into the future, always being in the present regardless of our past. This is the danger posed by those who continue to doubt our motives and our ideas. This is why we need to have an adult conversation, and that can start as soon as those who doubt speak first, for they have the responsibility to accept our motives and ideas so we do not lose the future.

To avoid this danger, presently we require a means to attain the future, a movement beyond our present past, and this is our hope. To change from the present to the future is, on the one hand, only possible in hope. On the other hand, there is a danger that when we pass by the present, we will find ourselves in another present, only accumulating moments that have passed. This is no way to win the future.

Hope is the belief that we can really move from the past through the present into the future, but there is no doubt that this cannot be accomplished without change. We hope, therefore, for change. Change is an audacious hope. Do we really believe that the present can move to the past so as to allow us to move into our future together with our shared reality? This change, a change we can believe in audaciously, is precisely what we hope for!

Those on the other side of the aisle are not on the side we are on. Only be removing the divide between us will we be able to claim that we are undivided, on the same side. Neither do I, in my unwavering and immutable faith and hope, move forward or backward, left or right, up or down, or at an angle whatsoever, and yet I affirm to you I am moving on this matter with all due consideration. Without division or distinction, we must take sides. We must side with the hope of the future without any divide, especially without those who remain on the other side once the sides have been eliminated by our mutual considerations and efforts to hope for the future. This is the way of our people, even if our people have never explored this way before in the past. Despite our many uncertainties, there is nothing of which we are not sure.

I know that working together, we can accomplish this change, moving from the present—transforming it even as the sun rises, into a new day. The sun will set on the past, and the dawn of a new day means change. Together, under the leadership of audacious, hopeful leaders, we will make the sunrise mark a new day for our hope, for our future. We will stand present to make the day after yesterday our day before tomorrow. We can only do so in hope today. We can only do so by bold, audacious change, such as the change that turns day into night. It is a bold change to change darkness into light, to bring day out of night, and to bring our future into the present. This is winning the future, my friends, and working together we will audaciously find our way through this present.

The present may feel like it lasts a long time. The more cynical among us, mainly on the other side of our undivided union, believe that we are fated to remain always in the present, with the past behind and the future ahead. Yet we cannot afford such an ideology. Understanding the advances of science in this regard makes clear our path, for the present is constantly moving into the future, even if some will be left behind—the naysayers, those without the audacity of hope: they will be left in the past. Those who believe in change, will see that change all around, and this will strengthen our hope for even more change, so that everyone will—eventually—move from our present into the future so that there will be nobody left behind in the present. We cannot afford for anyone to remain unchanged, for that would be stagnation. We will all be in the future, and even the naysayers and pundits who doubt our ability to hope audaciously, to accomplish this change from our present into the future, will of necessity join us in our victory of change. I vow that if we see this change, if we see the sunrise and the dawn of a new day, they also will see it unless they are blind and unable to see; still, they will be proven wrong, and then they will join us in our hope for continued change and advancement. Then we the people, and the other people, will praise the beauty of our hope for change, and we will all live or die in the future, whenever that may be. This is winning the future.

Indeed, the future is our destiny, and we cannot afford to avoid the future. The stakes are simply too high. Even now, the time for what I have previously said has passed into the past, and presently we see that the future is right around the corner. If we do not choose to lead into the future, we will be behind. Staying behind in the past is no real option for us, and benefits nobody. Remaining in the present is always easy, but that is not who we are as a people. We are the people of the future, and it is in the future that we belong.

If we are not leading into the future, others we will follow, and following means that we are not first, that we are not the leaders. This is an audacious moment in our present history: for we can lead into the future. We must, for this is our fate, and we cannot allow ourselves to avoid the inevitable. Our present crisis is the future and the presence of our past. We must not foolishly avoid our responsibility to lead the way through the present crisis, for then we will likely end up following in a future crisis.

Therefore, without being in front of anyone, I will lead those who will follow behind me into our future.

All this is precisely why I call on all our people to hope for change and, if not yet hoping for change, then changing for hope. Hope for change and change for hope: this is the future offered to you. This is our goal: winning the future. Therefore, in the strength of our union, undivided we stand presently to propose that, in order to ensure that the future comes, we pass our present future plan to spend the equivalent of last year's entire budget to stimulate the space-time contiuum. After all, we cannot ensure that the future will come if we are unwilling to invest in it.

This will require sacrifice for all our people, and particularly for some of those who only earn more than most. It is only ethical that we all share this sacrifice equally, and therefore those who have more should give more. This is the only way to ensure that tomorrow will arrive after today. Our opponents might object to such spending, and such a dialogue is absolutely necessary in a democracy as ours, where we have the right and freedom to debate whether tomorrow will come. Some say, "laissez faire," do nothing--wait and see. But we are beyond that now. That is the way of the past. We are so obviously in a time of unprecedented crisis.

There are those on all sides with whom I have consulted, experts in their respective fields, that tell me there is no absolute, one-hundred percent guarantee that there will be a future. So I am convinced that with a substantial investment today, tomorrow will come. That is how we win the future. God bless America.

(How's that for an adult conversation?)

Egypt: A Cautionary Note

2011-02-11T18:02:00.000-06:00

February 11, 2011: this morning, Hosni Mubarak effectively resigned from the presidency of Egypt following his ineffective responses to the protests of the last 18 days. Undoubtedly, his latest public address indicated his willingness to leave later in the year as well as, I believe, his sincere desire for a stable, orderly process to the new government that the protestors demanded. Still, Mubarak seemed out of touch with the realities of a new world of instant (and easily accessible) communication and information technologies. Indeed, when the Vice President later called on the masses to ignore satellite television broadcasts, he underscored the reality that the government could no longer control the population through control of the state-run media.

It is most unclear what will occur in Egypt in the days to come. The change in regime that has been accomplished opens the door for a new constitution (since the current situation following the de facto resignation of Mubarak is non-constitutional—a situation he was apparently trying to avoid). What form that will take is unknown. Perhaps it will lead to more political liberty for the Egyptian people. Perhaps the process will be hijacked by unscrupulous technocrats left over from the previous regime or military. Perhaps the process will devolve into an unsustainable experiment of democracy subject to the manipulation of radical and religious organizations. There are numerous risks.

For all the concern in our American media and Congress regarding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, an organization long outlawed by the government but operating nonetheless, Egypt is a predominantly Muslim nation with a Christian minority of about ten percent (10%). Egyptian opinion polls indicate that a substantial majority of citizens would prefer to see more religious influence on the government—something the Mubarak regime (and Sadat’s before him) has long resisted.

Egypt’s demographics are not promising either. With the highest percentage of college graduates in the Arab world, Egypt also has the most unemployed college graduates. Generally, the population is younger (true for most of the Muslim world) and largely disaffected because of poor economic conditions and prospects. In such time, there is often a turn to religious conservatism.

In the case of Egypt, this usually means conservative Islam. This does not bode well for the Christian minority.

During the protests, Coptic Orthodox clergy and citizens participated in the protests against Mubarak, and the reasoning is rather simple: in addition to reasons held in common with the remaining majority of Egyptians, the Coptic minority has many grievances against the government’s policies toward the Christian community. While in theory equal, the minority was often persecuted by the government or its associated groups. The courts were not much help, and the police often exacerbated the suffering of the community. For a long time, the government resisted defending the rights of the Christian minority in specific cases so as to avoid provoking the sentiments of the Muslim majority. This is not exactly the same as scapegoating, but looking the other way because enforcing the law would be politically inexpedient has a similar effect: making the minority more vulnerable to lawlessness and violence.

Now, with the future uncertain, we must pray that any new constitution and government in Egypt will avoid the temptation to discard the secular principles of the former government that, theoretically, protected the rights of the Christian minority. Hopefully, Islamic conservatism (or fundamentalism) will not assert itself formally in the constitutional framework of the nation so as to respect the rights of the Coptic Orthodox and other Christian groups.

Tolerance for Christian populations varies widely in the Arab world, from very tolerant and friendly (such as in Syria) to the totally intolerant (as in Saudi Arabia), while most other Arab states fall somewhere in between the extremes. (Non-native Christians often fare much better than “indigenous” Arab or, in Egypt’s case, Coptic Christians).

What a democratic Arabic society will bring to the Church is uncertain, if only because there is so little experience of actual democracy in the Arab world. Yet democracy does not always appear in the form we know of it in the United States. (Even in the USA, minority rights were not always respected.) We certainly hope that the spirit exhibited by many of the protestors in Egypt will translate into a fairer, more just society for all citizens, and perhaps especially for our Coptic Orthodox sisters and brothers.

In Spirit and In Truth

2011-01-29T13:23:00.000-06:00

In a short commentary within the Chicago Sun-Times this past week (January 27, 2011), author John W. Fountain tries to justify his own “defection” from “going to church” in a statement (“Worship doesn’t have to require going to church”) that is both profoundly obvious and profoundly senseless. Indeed, it sums up rather nicely the problem with a certain segment of Christian Protestantism that perceives a “conflict” between the so-called “institutional” church (to where one goes) and “being church” (which can occur, apparently, anywhere).

In fact, Fountain confuses in this article—among other things—worshipping and the very concept of “church.” He asks, “What if the church is broken, no longer a healing station, not a shelter from the storm, insensitive, misguided, puffy, stuffy, insincere, hurtful, dysfunctional?” This would suggest that his “absence, or defection from the institutional church” was due to his church being this way. But that is not actually what he states.

His explanation for not “going to church” was because there “seemed something very isolating about the whole church experience.” What is more "isolating" than not being with other people in some place? Being alone is, by definition, isolation. Isolation is probably not the word this author is really seeking.

Nonetheless, this isolating experience was not due to any demonstrated insensitivity or insincerity, for in fact he begins the article describing a rather nice, fun activity. He liked Sunday School and singing in the choir, and so forth. Rather the cause of the isolating experience was due to the fact that

Most kids I knew didn’t go to church and our religious circle seemed seldom to connect with anyone beyond our walls. Oh, I saw powerful testimonies and saw what ‘the saints’ claimed were the myriad manifestations of the Spirit. But all this paled in comparison to the manifestation of darkness and evil that encompassed my neighborhood, where thieves even broke into the church, stole offering plates, choir robes and tambourines.

This disparity, between those who went and were in the church and those without leads Fountain to conclude that, “Even back then, there seemed a fixation with ‘going to church’ more than on ‘being’ the church.” Why? Because some neighborhood kids were not members of the Church? That makes no sense at all. Was his "religious circle" to "connect" with the darkness and evil in the neighborhood, or those who stole from them? Because the "darkness" was greater than the pale "manifestations of the Spirit" there was a deficiency? Perhaps Fountain, in observing these "myriad manifestations" was not really viewing the Spirit. And if not really the Spirit, perhaps he was in the wrong place when he went to church.

Of course, it does not logically follow that as a child he was aware of all the activities of his church, which accounts for his almost constant reference to how things “seemed.” Yet even if the church did not engage the surrounding neighborhood in many ways, this still does not argue against going to church. In fact, the isolation of the church from the “darkness and evil” of his neighborhood is precisely what made it a “healing station” or a “shelter from the storm.” Indeed, the teachings of Jesus he liked to learn about make it very clear that there is an important distinction between the Church, as the Body of Christ, and the world in need of salvation. He is apparently familiar with at least one episdoe from the Gospel according to John, but in the first chapter the incompatibility of the Church with darkness is clearly stated. Note as well that ideally, according to Fountain, the church is described as a place to where one would go (“healing station,” “shelter”).

But there is more senselessness in the article as well. He confuses going to church or being the church with the act of worship: “Should going to church be our focus, or going to God in prayer, in our homes, our cars, assembling with our friends in coffee shops, parks, rented facilities, street corners and wherever the Spirit leads,…” The question is why these acts are incompatible with going to church or why they might be mutually exclusive. Yet there is also a sense here that Fountain is still suggesting that we “go” somewhere (coffee shops, parks rented facilities) to be the church. After all the very word church in the bible, in the original language, is ekklesia, “to be called together,” an assembly. Of course, a particular location for such an assembly is presupposed. But then that would require going.

Without being explicit, Fountain seems in all this to have rejected going to a particular church, while still suggesting that he goes somewhere (else?) to “be the Church.” There is a lack of coherence to his argument. He raises the point about Jesus’ encounter with the Samaritan Woman in the Gospel according to John, who questions Jesus about the correct place to worship. Jesus, according to Fountain, was not concerned with “where” but “he answered not by telling her where, but in what manner to worship: In spirit and in truth.” Perhaps Fountain has not noticed, but there is no great demand, if any, that Christians can only worship in Jerusalem or in Samaria—the Samaritan woman’s concern.

In an Orthodox Christian perspective, there is no conflict between “going to church” and “being the church.” Indeed, one must “go” to be a member of the church, to join other members of the Church. Worship, at times, might be personal and solitary—I know of no person who would or could deny that. But if Fountain really wants to worship in truth, he might want to recall some more of the lessons from his Sunday School experience. At the Last Supper, Jesus said, “Do this in remembrance of me…” That act of remembrance and supper has always been the central focus of the worshipping Church (our Divine Liturgy, the Eucharist). The communion and unity of the Church presupposes as well both the presence of those assembled (ekklesia) as well as—significantly enough for Fountain’s concern—a going out “to all nations.”

In a rightly balanced Christian experience, there is no conflict between communal worship and personal devotion to God, nor to “coming together” in worship (perhaps in the rented facility Fountain mentions or in an establish building, it does not really matter) and a going out to all persons precisely to invite them into the church. This would be a fulfillment of the Great Commission of our Lord to His Church, and only in obedience to our Lord can we even hope to worship our God “in spirit and in truth.”

On the Destiny of Green Bay, Wisconsin, circa 2036.

2011-01-23T19:53:00.001-06:00

I feel that a follow-up to my recent blog on football is required, since many, rightly, seemed to take it seriously. My theological position on the Green Bay Packers is somewhere on the blog page to the right, buried in the links to past blogs (last week). I sit by my position on the matter. I make no excuses for the Bears loss, they only played one decent quarter. Got beat....not overly surprising, just sad. Very sad.

Now that the fallenness of the world has once again been affirmed with the victory of the Green Bay Packers over God's Bears, there is no longer a righteous team for whom to root. Steelers, from steel companies, destroy the environment, plus there is a commandment against steeling (I think). Jets are also not good for the environment, and the Joe Namath commercials for Brut were just obnoxious. Obviously, this was written before the outcome of the AFC Championship game. One could, I guess, in the spirit of communion and fellowship, cheer for the Orthodox Christian on the field if he makes it to the Superbowl (Go Troy, but get a haircut!), but in the end, it does not matter. All is lost. All but a dream....feebler than shadows.

My normal blogs will continue once the anti-depressants kick in and I complete my lamentation. Probably sometime mid-week.

And on a lighter note, I learned on Discovery Channel that a major asteroid, with the potential to destroy all life on our planet if it should strike us, will pass within our outer sattelites ring in 2026, with a 1 in 1000 chance or so that it will actually hit the earth in April, 2036. It is traveling many thousands of feet per second (a bullet is about one thousand feet per second), way faster than sound, so by the time we can even hope to see it, we will be literally melting. (Remember, by the way, bullets travel faster than sound too. Just a friendly piece of advice: if you hear a gunshot nearby, it's already too late to duck and you might not want to exert yourself unncesessarily...unless there might be a second shot... Forget it, not very useful advice; just duck anyway. Unless you are a shareholder in a certain professional football club from Wisconsin.)

One woman, among those "people on the street" interviewed as to what they would do if they knew the asteroid was definitely going to hit, said (this is no lie, but may be a slightly inexact quotation), "While it might sound selfish, I think I would want the experience of having a child." Might?

Bradford Swanson of Chicago, IL, dismissing the asteroid scenario, said (this is no no lie), "If an asteroid hits the earth, I'll eat my hat."

Hugh Wellenger of Green Bay, Wisconsin, similarly dismissive, said (this is no no lie), "Ya hey der, if a steroid hits the eart, I'll eat the cheese on my head." He meant, I presume, an "asteroid" and "earth," otherwise I do not know what an eart is.

I don't know who is more disturbing: cheeseheads or amoral (with an "a-" not an "im-") airheads who just want the mothering "experience" before their world is vaporized. In any case, there are far too many of them..

The views on this blog have not been tested by the FDA, and make no health-related claims. Only Kenneth knows the frequency, so please do not approach Dan Rather. Have a day. Men's amends for mensa mend. And now YOUR special mood emoticon: : |

Spiritual Malaise and the Green Bay Packers

2011-01-18T15:35:00.001-06:00

God cares about football, if only because so many human beings care about football. This is why, as Orthodox Christians, we have a responsibility to care about football as well (though we should not gamble on football, which would be a waste of money better used for godly purposes elsewhere).

Now some may not recognize the theological importance of football, dismissing it as a frivolous distraction from the important matters of life. Yet as an Orthodox Christian pastor, I certainly must respond to those members of the Church who do maintain an ardent, even fanatical interest in football—particularly for those whom their fanaticism is actually a debilitating, spiritual malady indicative of a profound mental confusion and disorientation. As a pastor I feel the responsibility to speak out against such a spiritual pathology.

I am of course speaking of Green Bay Packer fans. I ministered among them during a brief missionary stay in Milwaukee. Unfortunately, I was newly ordained at the time and without the experience necessary to counteract the pagan-esque influence from the north. As an associate pastor, I was unsuccessful in convincing my superior, the pastor, of the issue’s importance and its threat to the moral fabric of the nation. But I digress…

It is a seriously disturbing mental defect, and socially disruptive, to wear cheese on one’s head. Cheese is a food, not an article of clothing. When persons cannot discern the difference between clothing and food, we can state there is a profound psycho-spiritual malaise. It perhaps need not be said that the type of cheese is irrelevant in this instance of severe psychopathology.

Not all Green Bay Packer fans, of course, wear cheese on their heads. Yet many who do not actually take pride (pride is bad) in being known as those who do (“I’m a cheesehead!”) in a bizarre, misguided pandering to the mentally ill, perpetuating a mythology of social acceptability and civility. It is cruel mocking of those who require psychiatric assistance.

But this is not the only problem that Green Bay Packer fans have. There are other spiritually debilitating conditions inherent to rooting for this team.

When God created the heavens and the earth, he created Bears, not packers—meat packers, to be more precise. Indeed, eating meat was not a privilege given to Adam and Eve in the Garden; they were called to eat fruit. After the Flood, Noah was permitted to eat meat, and I do not suggest that eating meat is by any means wrong, but the wasteful consumption and exploitation of God’s creation is certainly wrong, and this is exactly what happens in a meat-packing plant.

The Green Bay Packers were named for the Indian Packing Company of Green Bay, Wisconsin, the team’s first official sponsor. They packaged their meat products under the brand name “Council Meats” in reference to an Indian tribal council. Unlike the Indians, however, which would have been an honorable name up until the end of the twentieth century (at which time it would have become politically incorrect), meat-packers routinely wasted much of the slaughtered animals they were processing for food. The Indians for which the company was named respected their environment, as well as the animals they relied upon for sustenance. They discarded as little of the animal as possible. Meat-packers are, by nature of the industry, and in comparison to the indigenous tribes of the upper Midwest, wasteful. Being wasteful is bad.

It is an unfortunate, sinful exploitation of God’s providence for humanity’s nourishment. Even if most of us today participate in this by our gluttonous desire for packaged meats, we need not take pride in it. Yet, contrary to a properly moral humility, Green Bay Packer fans glorify this sad, ruinous legacy of the meat-packing industry. Perhaps some are ignorant of this historical nature of their sin, making it one of the “involuntary” sins for which we continuously pray to be forgiven within the life of the Church. But it is sin nonetheless.

Furthermore, the same fans actually dishonor their fellow human beings, the Indians, by so earnestly championing those who exploited the proud heritage of indigenous Americans by using their collective name for shameless profit while degrading the very values of the tribes who respected meat. There is an implicit admission of this unfortunate historical circumstance since the team is technically a “non-profit organization” with public ownership (profits of the team’s operations being forwarded to the Green Bay Packer Foundation). It is a futile exercise in trying to sanitize the gross insults enacted throughout their history. If the Japanese could finally apologize to the Chinese and Koreans for their Imperial atrocities during the Second World War; if the Pope could apologize to the Jewish people for the atrocities against them during the Inquisition or for the Vaticans (relative) silence during the Holocaust, the Green Bay Packers could have the decency to withdraw their name in favor of a befitting homage to native American history. Perhaps the “Arrowheads” would finally allow them to help alleviate the hallucinatory hysteria of “cheeseheads,” though I do fear that thousands of fans would be mortally injured by handling bows and arrows….

But sadly, there is more. For many years, the offensive team was led by a quarterback who could not pronounce his name correctly (Favre), leading millions of spectators to insult the French and their diplomatic language. He was not, however, the first, and the French--no matter how deserving of the insult—have had to wrestle with the tortured pronunciation of Lambeau (Field) since the latter-third of the twentieth century. Indeed, Midwestern Americans have long tortured the French language (Des Plaines, Illinois; Des Moines, Iowa--misprounced, and don't even think about trying to correct a native of Marseilles, IL!). Originally, of course, the Packers played at Bellevue Park, fittingly named for the notorious criminal psychiatric ward in a prominent New York hospital. Now, the quarterback is named after the brother of Moses in a transparent attempt to take cover under biblical vocabularly; unfortunately Aaron was responsible for leading the Hebrews to worship the golden calf, something highly displeasing to God, not to mention Moses, even if he was later forgiven (reprentant Packer fans can be forgiven too!). And to add further insult, the Defensive Coordinator is named Dom Capers, from the Latin “Dominus” for Lord or “Master” and “Capers” from “Caper”: an “audacious leap, a capricious escapade, or an illegal act." So it is obvious that the man intends on cheating. Ultimately “Caper” derives also from the Latin for “goat” (capra), and the goat’s head has long been associated with Satanism and the Rolling Stones. It is simply a matter of fact that cheering for the Green Bay Packers is tantamount to cheering while on the road to perdition.

In contrast to packers of meat products, wasteful and exploitative of God’s creation as they are, we rightly set forth as opposition the Bears. God created bears, a noble animal that even the Indians respected, no matter how disrespectful Green Bay Packer fans may be to bears or Indians. And there is more. The Bear’s head coach is Lovie Smith, named after the highest and greatest of virtues. The Bear’s quarterback, rather than emulating some famous personality, is also named after one of God’s creations (Jay). And rather than flaunt his true, valiant nature, the middle linebacker of the Bears bears a name that derives from the German prefix “Ur”, meaning primitive, or “original,” and the French (alas, the language turns up everywhere) “lacher,” meaning to “loosen, let go, fail, or act cowardly.” Brian Urlacher is simply the “original coward.” This profound humility, also a primary virtue, is accentuated by the first name of the Bear’s Director of Physical Development, “Rusty” (Jones).

But what is in a name?

Still, it would be wrong on this approaching Sunday to root and cheer for a team that historically and symbolically represents opposition to God and the exploitation of his creation, both the natural, animal world and human beings. It is only right and proper, to send the correct message to the world, to hope and pray that the Bears win. That would be a sign of justice and a restoration of the natural order. It would be of uncalculable benefit to "cheeseheads" everywhere (and many have escaped from Wisconsin).

Of course, bears do not always triumph. Many of the early trappers who settled in northern Wisconsin killed many bears for no good reason at all. They were bad.

The Political Divide and the Orthodox Way

2011-01-14T14:41:00.002-06:00

We live in a time when the American political landscape is marked by a serious divide between “conservatives” and “liberals” or “progressives.” The divide is nothing new, and has been present in this land from a time prior to the nation’s founding. Today, however, ideological rhetoric and electoral politics favor stark contrasts; this is perhaps something new only in the sense that the degree to which it is noticeable has seemed to increase, but there have certainly been periods in our nation’s history where the rhetoric between the conservatives and liberals was even more heated.

Nonetheless, Christians are tempted to join in on the political debate. Indeed, many feel it is our civic duty to do so and, at minimum, participate in the political process. However, many Christians do so uncritically, without discerning the real issues and ideological positions of the major (as well as minor) political parties. Christians may not need to be faulted so severely, for even major figures in the political parties have adopted ideological positions without critical examination. After all, the two major American political parties, the Republican (generally conservative) and Democratic (generally liberal or progressive) often adopt positions that are internally inconsistent or, in some cases, incoherent.

In political terms, “conservative” generally means faithfulness to the past, perceiving change as good only when circumstances demand. Conversely, “liberal” or “progressive” (the latter term preferred since “liberal” really is a misnomer) values change, in the sense of positive development. Conservatives love to speak about the preservation (conservation?) of freedoms; progressives/liberals like to champion freedoms as well. The difference is the priority given to some freedoms over others, as evidenced in the debates regarding the legality of abortion. We may couch the rhetoric in terms of “rights,” but what we really mean is the exercise of certain freedoms or the limitation of them.

Of course, the Republican Party values some development (e.g. economic development, new markets, etc.) while decrying others (such as new interpretations of the U.S. Constitution). The Democratic Party resists possible changes (e.g. extending a “right to life” to the pre-born) and welcomes the status quo (social entitlement spending) while seeking to expand the services of government, the interpretation of the Constitution, and endorses other proactive programs according to perceived necessities or good. The Republican Party champions a right to life for the pre-born, but allows that the post-born may relinquish that right and be executed for various violations of the social contract. The Democratic Party denies that the pre-born have any right to life, but affirms such a right to the post-born who are slated for execution due to some violation of the social contract.

Both are rather inconsistent when it comes to their primary labels of conservative or progressive. Generally, the ideology of either of the two dominant parties is based simply on opposing the affirmations of the other side. This is primarily because the two parties share, at their core, an identical belief in liberalism (as classically defined) and progress.

In fact, in the wider scope of human history, most Americans—irrespective of political affiliation—are rather liberal, in the sense of interested in and protective of their freedom. Yet there is also another sense where this common liberality comes into play, and that is precisely the understanding of history. Americans, like most persons raised and educated in Western civilization, basically believe in the positive evolution of history, meaning that there is a fundamental belief that as history progresses, society develops for the better. Certainly, there may be periods where cultural and societal evolution takes a wrong turn with negative results, but generally the flow of history leads to improvements: technology advances, social harmony advances, science and understanding advance for the better. The core value, above any and all other ideological considerations, is progress and development. In this sense, the underlying expectation is that the modern (or, rather, the contemporary) is inherently of more worth than the pre-modern, the past. Or, in other words, new is better than old. And it is precisely in this sense that Western civilization is generally, ideologically, progressive.

The difference between the American political parties in this sense is only a matter of degree (not too fast, not fast enough) and priority (the collective, the individual). The commonality of both lies in an agreed summum bonum: the social contract is for the promotion of individual prosperity and eudemonia: “Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” This is the basis of what some have called the “rugged individualism” of American life. Of course, for Jefferson and the “founding Fathers” of the United States, liberty meant personal freedom from tyranny—from someone else dictating what could or could not be done. Likewise, happiness was not simply an emotional state of contentment, but was related to the ancient Greek concept of eudemonia, which Artistotle basically defined as “living well and doing well”; this was not necessarily related to moral virtue, but rather to physical health, comfort and material prosperity. Virtue—in its sense of “excellence”, “to excel”, and not necessarily in relation to morality—was a means to this end.

Of course, this has very little to do with Christian doctrine, at least as it has been articulated and manifested in the Orthodox Christian tradition.

First, development is not always a positive thing, and in the ancient Hellenistic milieu of early Christianity, developments following from the beginning, from the “original” as it were, was usually seen as a decline. Change was, usually, not good, since perfection was associated with the original state of any particular thing or “idea.” Such was a premise of Platonic and Neo-Platonic thought. (And note that in antiquity societal change and advancement—technological or otherwise—was far slower than we experience today, so there was little perception of it and thinkers were not required to confront such a reality. Our situation is now far different.)

To some extent, this Hellenistic philosophical notion could be reconciled with biblical revelation: the “development” of the original, pristine created order of God was a fall. However, the same position, taken to extremes or too closely aligned with Greek philosophical premises, could lead to heretical error, where any and all movement or change from the original or “beginning” was seen as inherently sinful and fallen (as articulated in authors such as Origen—there is a pun of sorts here). Maximos the Confessor corrected the more extreme forms of this philosophical influence on theology, but the underlying attitude regarding change in general was not thereby eradicated from the Christian mindset. It still appeared in various guises.

For example, there is a strong, inherent conservatism in Orthodox theology since innovation is not a mark of “progress,” but rather an avenue to heresy. Of course, this does not mean there can be no change in theological expression: there has been numerous theological developments, though usually as a reaction to other theological innovations; combating heresy might require a new approach to articulating the content of the faith, but only to demonstrate that the content of faith is essentially the same or, perhaps more accurately, to protect the content of the faith from change and alteration. Thus, it is almost standard operating procedure to “connect” contemporary theological efforts to the “tradition” (patristic, liturgical, etc.).

Furthermore, personal change (“repentance”; metanoia) was and is a good thing, but only within the context of the Church community in conformity with the Body of Christ and the prototype of humanity in Christ. The understanding of the human person as “image” of God related humanity to an original intention by God for His human creation, from which humanity deviated and to which, in Christ, it is being restored. Likewise, and most important, was the innovation of the incarnation of Christ. Indeed, it can be argued that the first major controversy we know of in the Church was that between conservatives and “liberals,” the latter being represented by Saint Paul reacting against the conservative “Jewish” party that considered conformity to the norms of Mosaic Law (e.g. circumcision) a prerequisite for Church membership. Yet Saint Paul also was greatly concerned with “tradition” and consistency in matters of Gospel truth.

For a millennium and a half, social views and “politics” were evolving, but slowly. Only during the Enlightenment in Western Europe do we “pick up the pace.” It re-shaped the philosophical foundations of political theory—mostly by doing away with important theological and metaphysical ideas. In many respects, the development of political theory in Western civilization developed in reaction to the philosophical underpinnings of classical Western Christian theology, and it is no surprise to historians that classical “liberalism” and modern democratic principles largely developed in areas strongly influenced by the Protestant Reformation—though the situation is admittedly more complicated than asserting the Protestantism led to modern democracy.

By the time of the founding of the United States, though undertaken by persons who were undoubtedly “religious” in the common meaning of the term, political theory in the Western world had for long departed from political thinking in those regions where Eastern Christians generally resided. In fact, since around the time of the beginning of the modern age (around the time of the Fall of Constantinople in 1453) most Eastern Christians struggled to survive under the “political” domination of non-Christian powers. Political theory was not a primary concern. Much of the Christian East lived under autocratic regimes until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and even then the majority of Orthodox Christians continued to live under hostile regimes of one sort or another. Those areas, such as Greece, that were “liberated” from such powers most often adopted Western-style governmental systems, if only because these were the most attractive alternatives to newly-independent states and, frankly, this was basically imposed by the powers that aided the struggle for independence.

Yet the Western political models and their theoretical/philosophical foundations were not deeply rooted in Orthodox Christian societies. In Greece, for example, the means of organization and governance of a democratic nation-state along the European parliamentary model were unknown until emancipation from the Ottoman Empire, and the imposition of this model on Greek society was not without difficulties (to some extent, these difficulties endure). The current problems faced by the Russian Federation in adopting “western-style” democracy (where it has sought to do so) is indicative that the model does not always “fit” easily with non-Western cultures.

In fact, this is admitted by the U.S. State Department. When Japan was re-organized after the Second World War, the U.S. could have imposed the same model of governance that it used, but did not, since it was well recognized that Japanese society at the time was not conducive to the American model. Democracy was introduced, but the form it took was very different. While it may appear even bizarre to Americans, part of the problem in Iraq and Afghanistan is that our expectations for a democratic rule of governance in these nations is actually foreign to the “philosophical” and cultural values of the peoples residing there. Afghans and Iraqis (simplifying for all the diverse ethnic sub-groups in each nation) do not have the tradition of “rugged individualism” that led to our form of government. The values of our American culture (and its embedded notion of “rights”) are not necessarily the primary values of those (or many other) cultural traditions, no matter how “self-evident” they may appear to us.

Indeed, many of the “self-evident” values and rights of the American constitutional tradition are not, in fact, the highest or most important values to the Orthodox Christian tradition. At their core, the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are based on individualistic values, not personal values (as we might articulate them in theology). At the basis of all American rights is a right to a freedom from the government and restrictions it might otherwise employ (a right to free speech is really a refusal to allow government to restrict speech, a right to religious belief is really a refusal to allow the government to impose a religion or to have its own official—“established”—religion. Similarly, these are rights of freedom from the interference of other individuals imposing their will or infringing one’s own activities in these areas.

Not mentioned in our governmental notion of “human rights” are some important values from a Christian perspective. Under the American form of constitutional rights, one does not have a right to housing and shelter, food and nutrition, health and, perhaps most importantly and at the core of some serious political debate in our nation, to life. In the latter case, this is why abortion on demand is permitted and executions can occur. Neither is a situation that can be acceptable to an Orthodox Christian.

This critical, theological view of the concept of “rights” and freedoms is in the background of the recent statements by the Russian Orthodox Church (Patriarchate of Moscow) criticizing the idea of “human rights” as outlined by Western democracies. While we may have reason to suspect that some of this criticism serves the political interests of the Russian government (with which the Church has aligned itself in recent years) and Russian nationalism/patriotism, it does show that Orthodox Christian should critically examine the political presuppositions of their own society.

This does not mean, necessarily, that Orthodox Christians should not participate in government. It means that Orthodox Christians should be wary of entering into the political arguments of our day and presuming that one political party or the other share the values of Orthodox Christianity. Just because, for example, a party or group is against capital punishment does not mean that the reasons they do so are consonant with an Orthodox Christian value of human life. Orthodox Christian probably should not want to associate with those who, like the Orthodox, oppose willful termination of a pre-born life, but who advocate means of advancing their agenda that are likewise counter to Orthodox Christian values (like the bombing of an abortion clinic or murder of abortionists). Our values in both instances are simply not the same.

In the end, Orthodox Christians should critically examine the positions taken in our political debates and the rhetoric defending them, uncovering the core values that serve as their foundation. Only then can we make proper decisions in terms of supporting or opposing (or, frankly, being indifferent) to policies and agendas of politicians. Conservatives often neglect the higher aspirations of a society to progress in support of citizens and their common welfare. Progressives (or “liberals” in today’s parlance) often neglect enduring values and rush to implement “reforms” without consideration of unintended consequences. Neither form of neglect is good.

To quote Winston Churchill, “Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

That still does not make it good, and certainly western-style democracy should not automatically be presumed to be the “Orthodox way.”

The Exploitation of Tragedy: The Decline of American Civility

2011-01-11T16:09:00.001-06:00

Following the heinous murder of six persons and the attempted murder of an Arizona congresswoman this weekend, the speculation on the murderer’s motive began almost immediately. A local law-enforcement official attributed the tragic and horrendous act to the “vitriole” of political discourse as expressed on the radio and through other public media. Mostly, he—a Democrat—was making reference to conservative commentators who routinely use strong language to criticize or denounce their political opponents. Of course, he was admitting (recall he was the chief law enforcement official of the county where this occurred) that he was giving an opinion. No evidence could substantiate his opinion (or has since). The only connection, apparently, was the fact that two governmental officials were involved: a federal judge was also killed, though apparently he was not the primary target—nor were the elderly victims or the little girl of nine years. He was making a presumption: that this attack on a member of the U.S. Congress was politically motivated. Such things rarely are and, as it turns out, the killer was most likely mentally ill, a misfit with a deranged mind.

The attack on Ronald Reagan, Republican, was also not politically motivated, but another instance of a deranged mind seeking to impress a Hollywood star. The attack on Gerald Ford (Republican) was not political in the normal sense, but was perpetrated by Squeaky Fromme of the Manson Family--deranged, though she believed she could begin a race-war by her act and vindicate Charlie. Lincoln was certainly assassinated for political reasons, true. But he was a Republican, so apparently this does not count (not to mention he was a war criminal in the mind of his assassin). Guiteau shot President James Garfield for political reasons, sort of: he was disgruntled since his support of Garfield was not rewarded with an ambassadorship. But Garfiled was also a Republican. Czolgosz shot McKinely; McKinely was a Republican so the reasons probably don’t matter, but Czolgosz was a leftist—actually an anarchist, which is about as left as you can go on the political spectrum. He was inspired by vitriolic political speech: that of Emma Goldman, a renowned American anarchist. She was actually arrested for her involvement which, as later revealed, was to incite Czolgosz; she was release but never condemned Czolgosz.

The last assassination of a member of Congress, Senator Robert Kennedy, by Sirhan Sirhan was politically motivated (at least in part; he also seems to have been mentally ill, even if this did not render him legally “insane”), but the politics was not domestic; it involved Sirhan’s allegiance to the Palestinian cause against Israel. If Oswald killed President John F. Kennedy alone, he certainly did not do it because of the vitriolic political rhetoric of conservatives versus liberals/progressives, and Kennedy was not even all that liberal; perhaps, he was not liberal enough: Oswald was a communist

Other members of the American political scene were quick to jump on the bandwagon that attributed the violence in Tucson to political rhetoric. A liberal commentator at the New York Times was a little cautious: conservative rhetoric may not have been entirely responsible, but it was undoubtedly partially to blame. Many were quick to seek a connection between rightist political speech and the efforts of a disturbed and violent individual.

At least Rahm Emanuel, who has previously claimed that no crisis should remain unexploited for political advantage, did state that this atrocity should not be exploited. Then again, he is no longer the President’s Chief of Staff, but a Chicago mayoral candidate, and his newly-discovered moderation can only help his chances in a city known for its “windy” political rhetoric among a field of candidates not known for political discretion or moderation.

Other Democratic pundits referred to a “map” of the nation marked with bulls’ eyes/cross-hairs released by former Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin, noting that southern Arizona contained two marks (indicating congressional races targeted by her organization for support against Democrat candidates), failing to note a similar map with similar markings released much earlier by the Democratic National Campaign Committee. Likewise, Democrats are a bit deaf when the President can call Hispanic voters to “punish their enemies” in an election, who also does not wish to “quell the anger,” but use its motivational power to get political allies elected.

If we are honest, most of the “vitriolic” political speech in our nation comes from the political left, if only because the political right is too busy making money to talk to anyone or really care about radicalism. Sure, Limbaugh, Hannity, Levin, Beck and others talk about the political divide and are deeply suspicious about Democratic motives, even maligning the motives of politicians and the party. Yet they do not advocate violence (wanting their perceived opponents to fail is not tantamount to inciting violence). They do not actively engage in hate speech. (Al Sharpton…Democrat, Jesse Jackson…Democrat, both of whom have been directly responsible for inciting mob violence; Gore, Pelosi, Reid, Durbin, PETA, ACORN, Moveon.org and so forth have all denounced the political right in the most vile terms [comparing the right to Nazis, terrorists, and generally to other heartless beings, just to mention Durbin's comments]—to the point where they made the Clintons look like pillars of moderation.)

For decades, the Republican Party has been, in fact, criticized by many supporters (including nearly all the commentators on the political right) for not fighting Democratic fire with fire. Now they do, and the left cries foul.

But in the end, both sides of the political divide in this nation have been engaged in “vitriolic,” inciteful speech against their political opponents since the birth of the nation. It is nothing more nor anything less than the manipulation of the darkest fears of the public for political gain which, in reality, is nothing less than the personal power of politicians of all stripes. But it does seem that the rhetoric jumped to a new level right about the time that Gore lost his election…sorry, had the election stolen by Bush and the Supreme Court. It’s a little disingenuous for the left to complain now that their opponents are only mirroring their methods (does anyone remember the late 1960s and early 1970s?).

In the end, it will unfortunately continue, with both sides engaging in increasingly brutal, stupid commentary on their opponents for short-term political advantage. The reason is simple. It gains attention, and in an increasingly jaded and intellectually-deficient society, only the most bombastic, rude and provocative behavior merits attention (which is why Springer, Maury Povich, Oliver Stone and Joy Behar still have jobs, while Democrate Juan Williams was fired by NPR). The American public will settle for nothing less until there is a major social crisis, such as 9/11 to unite us. Even then, real social unity is fleeting in our increasingly individualistic, self-serving social construct. That will not change anytime soon. Politicians, always hypocritical, have turned governance and leadership into nothing more than another full-contact sport. Pretty soon we won't need the Super Bowl (except for the commercials).

Holy Water—Holy Life

2011-01-05T15:40:00.002-06:00

At the Feast of our Lord’s Baptism—Theophany or, in its “western” form, Epiphany—there is celebrated the Great Blessing of the Waters (Greek: Aghiasmos). This feast is the culmination of an extended festival beginning with the Nativity (Christmas), with all the days collectively known (but especially the final day, Theophany) in Greek as “The Lights” (Ta Phota). Indeed, in the Christian East the celebration of Theophany at the beginning of January marked a dual celebration of the “Appearance of God” (Theophania) in that both the Lord’s birth into the world and His baptism, marking the beginning of His “public” ministry, were observed jointly. And in fact to this day, the liturgical observances for Theophany are more elaborate than Christmas with the inclusion of the Great Blessing of the Waters.

Today, many Orthodox come to the churches seeking to obtain Holy Water from this blessing—a blessing that actually is designated to be observed twice on the feast. In fact, obtaining Holy Water has become, for many it would seem, the very reason for the Feast. This explains why so many can come to eagerly receive Holy Water but neglect the reception of the Holy Gifts of the Lord’s Body and Blood! Yet if observed according to the traditional “order” of the services, the first “gifts” offered to the faithful are precisely Holy Communion and, importantly, this is also the last gift offered to the faithful. Holy Water, the Great Blessing of the Waters, occurs in between two Divine Liturgies. Theophany is one of only three days of the liturgical year on which the Divine Liturgy is specifically celebrated twice (Pascha/Easter and the Nativity being the others); on no other day is this permitted.

In fact, the rule that only one Divine Liturgy be celebrated on any given day is so strong that in most places the first and main Divine Liturgy of Saint Basil the Great, held in conjunction with Great Vespers of all three feasts, is “transferred” to the morning hours, several hours before its traditional and normative place at sundown (the liturgical day begins at sundown). Theophany with the Nativity are together (since they began together) known as the “Winter Pascha”, and with the Resurrection at Pascha are so central to our liturgical life and piety that they are especially marked by the celebration of two eucharistic celebrations! Yet on Theophany, many consider the Holy Water to be the “essence” of the occasion.

Historically, both Pascha and Theophany (and, somewhat later, the Nativity) were the preferred days for the celebration of Baptism in the Church. And while the “Blessing of the Waters” is no longer observed at Pascha, being omitted once baptisms were infrequently observed in favor of other liturgical observances, the Great Blessing of the Waters is clearly a “
vestige” of the baptismal liturgical assembly of Theophany. Indeed, the core of the long prayer for the blessing of the water is the same “core” of the blessing of the baptismal waters celebrated at every baptism to this day—word for word. At Theophany, however, a long didactic section was added to the beginning and end of the prayer with specific references to the fact that the water would be now used by the faithful (drinking) and for the sanctification of homes—practices that developed over time as an outgrowth of reverence for the baptismal waters.

The baptismal waters (either in the church proper, an exterior fountain or natural body of water such as the ocean, lakes, rivers and so forth) were purified of “every malignant spirit.” Water could be dangerous: floods, storms at sea, but also contaminated drinking water could make one sick. Then with the invocation of the Holy Spirit, the water was “energized” (literally, “made operative”) to bring sanctification, blessings, health. Thus, it became a vehicle to communicate these to the faithful. Rather than just invoke through words these “operations” of the Holy Spirit, the use of water conveyed these in a manner that was felt as much as it was “heard” in the prayer—appealing, in a manner of speaking, to our entire being in body and soul (mind). Of course, the water that is blessed does not change as do the bread and wine of the Eucharist into the Body and Blood of Christ. The water remains water, though certainly in a manner of existence (tropos hyparxeos) that surpasses the “normal” everyday water we use everyday. It is not that the water changes into something else, something other than water (and it definitely does not change into the Holy Spirit!). It is that the water is “restored” to the state and purposes that God intended for water “in the beginning.” Water is, after all, a prerequisite and presupposition and necessity of our (earthly) life. And certainly, even in this “mortal coil” God intends benefits and blessings on His people. Yet the true food and nourishment of our life is not water, but blood, the Blood and Body of our Savior, received for everlasting life—something that water alone—blessed or not—cannot provide. It is our communion with, for and in Christ that remain “the reason for the season.”

This is precisely why in the formal “order” of the Feast of the Lord’s Baptism we celebrate the Divine Liturgy after an abbreviated Vespers, receive communion, bless the waters, and then continue with the “vigil” (now omitted in most places except for the final two services). At the end of the vigil we celebrate Matins following which we “process” to bless the waters again (traditionally, outside the church), process back to the church, and celebrate the Divine Liturgy.

If all this formal liturgical movement is now abbreviated or largely altered, it is for practical reasons. For example, it is still customary in most places to celebrate the second blessing of waters after the Matins and the Divine Liturgy (meaning both blessings in fact follow Holy Communion). Likely, this was to accommodate tardy parishioners—like that makes sense! Now, many know they can “skip” the majority of the services, show up at the end, and get their Holy Water to bring home—like that makes sense!

Indeed, many no longer invite the clergy to the home for the traditional “extension” of the ceremony in the household, believing that sprinkling Holy Water around the house themselves amounts to the same thing. This is mistaken. The entrance of the clergy into the household indicates that we have opened our homes to the Church and her faithful, turning our houses into an extension of the temple at which we normally worship. Thus everything within our household is thereby “sanctified.” This means, literally, “set apart for the use of serving God.”

Unlike some western Christian traditions, there is nothing in an Orthodox life that is not to be “entrusted,” “dedicated,” “offered back” and gifted to God who, of course, is Himself the source of “every good and perfect gift.” All our “things” as well as our bodies and souls constitute our “life,” and the sprinkling of Aghiasmos reminds us of that fact. Then we can affirm that God has “revealed Himself to us” (Greek: epephanen imin). This is the true “epiphany” and manifestation of God in our lives, “for He is with us.”

A New Calendar?

2011-01-02T00:50:00.003-06:00

Though I celebrated the Feast of the Nativity of our Lord on December 25, 2010 (Gregorian or “New” Calendar), I certainly recognize that a majority of Orthodox Christians around the world have not yet celebrated the “winter Pascha.” They will do so on my January 7, which just so happens to be December 25 on the Julian, or “Old” Calendar.

The calendar issue has been a matter of some contention in parts of the Orthodox world, and is rather ignored in others, but it is of some importance.

In 1923, the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Church of Greece, eventually followed by several, but not all other (and not the most populous) autocephalous churches adopted a “Revised Julian” Calendar that mostly corresponded with the Gregorian (the technical details of the difference are not very practical since they won’t have an effect for about 790 years). This resulted in the fact that all Orthodox churches would continue to celebrate Pascha together (the Feast of the Resurrection, or “Easter”) since the Julian computations would be used by all; yet all other “fixed” feasts tied to a specific date would differ (such as Christmas).

The history of the calendar revision can be found on the Internet rather easily, and the details are no longer that much concern (since these events took place over a generation ago). The initial rejection of the Gregorian calendar in the 16^th century actually ignored the reality (long forgotten) of the recognition even in the Christian East during the 15^th century that the Julian calendar was seriously flawed. Calendars have been revised throughout human history; doing so would not be any betrayal of Christian doctrine and tradition. Indeed, canonical strictness—if that would have been the main criterion—probably would have demanded a change similar, if not identical, to the Gregorian.

Shockingly, under the Gregorian, it is theoretically possible for the Christian Pascha to fall before the Jewish Passover. Shockingly, this is irrelevant; as it was to the fathers who solved the paschal controversy in the first place by tying the date of Pascha to the first full moon after the vernal equinox. Jewish reckoning was irrelevant and unmentioned.

This means that canonically, the date of Pascha would be determined by an astronomical event which is really independent of any contrived calendar.

Truth is, the astronomical vernal equinox is no longer 100% accurate on the Gregorian calendar, and certainly is way off on the Julian (the traditional date is March 21). Truth is, we have a much better ability to accurately measure and predict when the vernal equinox will occur than they did in ancient or medieval times. We should use it.

The objections made by those seeking to maintain the “tradition” of the Orthodox Church can be easily answered by pointing to the canonical “exactness” of such a move. Likewise, if the Roman Church were to “adjust” in such a manner, there would be no question of any “capitulation” to Rome as a matter of principle. Indeed, the claim of capitulation is hollow; after 90 years what other “capitulation” can even the fiercest critics of the papacy or “ecumenism” claim? The adoption of a change in calendars has proven not to be a “slippery slope.”

Those following the Old Calendar would not be the only ones required to change. Those following the “New” should also change. In those places where persons were, in fact, persecuted or harassed for their observance of a calendar (Greece, Romania, perhaps elsewhere), those bodies responsible (in whole or complicit) should acknowledge the damage this has done. After all, the Church of Greece maintains communion with several autocephalous churches that observe the Julian calendar, but did persecute clergy and laypersons in Greece who chose to retain it. Of course, many had denounced the adoption of the “New” as heretical or worse. Such attitudes should be set aside, because in these instances both sides were and are wrong.

In fact, as a parish priest in the United States, I really don’t care what calendar is followed; my preference is that one calendar be followed. Astronomical accuracy would be ideal, but the reality is that there are other, more important things: such as common worship in each place by all members of the Church. Those who advocate Orthodox unity in this country should realize that such “customs” are far more important in the life of the faithful than “administrative” unity.

This is one area where “dis-unity” is noticeable, not only to Orthodox, but to non-Orthodox as well. If the very feast of the Lord’s Nativity was introduced to “baptize” the pagan festivities at the winter solstice, the point today is that the Orthodox gain nothing by maintaining what can only be characterized as a sectarian observance apart from the remainder of our contemporary society and apart from Orthodox sisters and brothers.

And why observe Pascha together (mostly, except for Finland) but not Christmas or any other festal (or fasting) observance? The “compromise” made in 1923 was surely well-intentioned, but the time has passed. There is simply no real benefit to maintaining an “old” and a “new” and a “revised” calendar at all; as we move into the distant future things will just get ridiculous with the constant and stead lag of the Julian calendar, with Pascha falling eventually sometime right around…Christmas!

Whatever path is chosen by those who choose these things, I simply would prefer that all Orthodox in our part of the world—and really, all around the world—would remain on the same page of the calendar.

And so this is Christmas...

2010-12-27T00:40:00.000-06:00

And so this is Christmas...and what have you done?
--John Lennon

     According to the Gospel according to Matthew, when Herod learned from the Magi that a new king of the Jews was born, he sought to kill the child. In a parallel to the story of the Hebrews in Egypt at the time of the birth of Moses, Herod--similar to Pharoah--figured he would slaughter the newborns up to two years of age just to be certain (Pharoah was seeking to limit the population of the Hebrews in his domain which, if left unchecked, could come to outnumber the native Egyptians). In an ironic twist, Joseph is warned to take the Child and his mother to Egypt (as Joseph of Genesis had gone to Egypt) to escape the "slaughter of innocents" remembered on the Church's calendar this week. The irony of the Messiah having to leave the Promised Land is obvious in the story, especially when it recalls the beginning of the Exodus narrative. But when it comes to the Lord's Nativity, the irony does not stop there. It continues in our own day.
     Christians in Egypt (at least native Christians, the Coptic Orthodox) are being persecuted by the Muslim majority today, sometimes through legal machination, sometimes through mob violence. The Body of Christ cannot find refuge in Egypt today. Christians in Egypt, though formally "protected" and comprising roughly 9-10% of the population, are literally dying because of their faith. Other forms of persecution--such as prejudice and harassment in the workplace, armed forces and government, are routine and commonplace. The unpopular, authoritarian government--with whom are own government has friendly relations--does very, very little beyond words so as to not antagonize a Muslim majority.

     In Iraq, Christmas celebrations for many Christian groups were canceled since the government there (despite the presence of US Armed Forces still) cannot protect them from sectarian (Muslim) violence. Christians have been killed and churches ransacked in recent weeks.

     On this Christmas, 38 Christians in Nigeria (where roughly half the population is Christian and the other half Muslim) were killed by an "extreme" Muslim sect.

     The slaughter of innocents continues. Certainly, we are not necessarily talking about the systematic murder of children as in the Bible, but there is little doubt that persons who are killed for their religious observance of Christmas are "innocents", not deserving of the death penalty at the hands of Muslims.
     It may be politcally incorrect to point out this religious violence. It may be contrary to our government's current foreign policy aims at placating Muslims around the world--or at least those who seem to like us least. Yet the "clash of civilizations" is real and, really, rather persistent. Except for the Crusades almost one thousand years ago, when is the last time we heard of a group of Christians systematically persecuting Muslims?
     Nonetheless, Christians are STILL dying for their faith around the world, especially in Africa and Asia. While Christians in the USA feel they must "pardon the expression" when using the very word "Christmas"; when Christian parents don't show up at School Boards complaining about the censorship and politically-motivated revisionism that suggests we somehow have a vacation at this time of year (or at least a day off due to a national holiday) because it is simply winter and seemingly unrelated to the Savior's birth.
     Indeed, we have Orthodox Christians who didn't even bother to go to Church--much less risk their lives for the Church and their faith--this Christmas (or the Sunday after).
     John Lennon was right to ask, "this is Christmas...and what have you done?" He may have preferred to "imagine" a world in which there was no religion in order to "give peace a chance." But I like to imagine a world where the Prince of Peace is given a chance by those who claim to know him and believe in him. And just because his situation has now changed somewhat, I am certain that Mr. Lennon now knows that this is Christmas, and a good number of people gave up their lives because of what they could imagine, and he once could not: a life beyond the corruption of this world, a life everlasting where all the hurts and damage of the world are undone. This is why the Lord was born in a cave and laid in a manger. This is why the Lord wills to make manifest his incarnation always. And that requires the members of his body actively "doing the faith" and spreading the Word. That is how we glorifty Him!

On the Nativity...

2010-12-24T14:20:00.000-06:00

What is happening? What is this great mystery to us? Innovated are the natures, and God becomes human.

--Saint Gregory the Theologian, On the Feast of Lights

In Revelation, we are given a glimpse of a day when the sun never sets, when all things are "made new." It is precisely at the Nativity of Christ when we see this process begin in a new way: through the self-emptying of the Word, who is born of the Virgin. The first Christmas is something that historically took place long ago, but I find it interesting that Saint Gregory questions the mystery in the present tense: "What is happening?" A later comment on this text by Saint Maximos the Confessor suggests that the Lord is constantly becoming incarnate within the world, largely due to our becoming ever-more perfect partakers of Christ, "partakers of the divine nature" in the words of 2 Peter 1:4. Indeed, as we gather in worship of God in Christ--in the Church--we gather with Christ and, most significantly, as Christ--the Body of Christ. In this way, He continues to become manifest in the world, even as we continue His ministry to bring "peace, goodwill to men" as the angels announced in Bethlehem so long ago, but whose proclamation and song continues.

May you have a most blessed Christmas! Christ is born! Glorify Him!

Fr. David

Pardon the expression...

2010-12-22T15:57:00.000-06:00

"Pardon the expression...a Christmas party..." A supposedly liberal (pardon the expression) commentator from National Public Radio (NPR) was describing her attendance at a Christmas (pardon the expression) party at the Pentagon and actually prefaced her description of the event with that phrase, "pardon the expression..." Wow (pardon the expression)! We have to apologize for naming an event by its actual name. If the person was attending a (pardon the expression) "winter solstice party" or a (pardon the expression) "holiday party" I doubt she would have thought it necessary to ask pardon for the expression. Apparently, the (pardon expression) progressive left of this country feels a need to apologize every time there is a reference to (pardon the expression) the name of Christ.

A Jewish woman working at a restaurant I frequent has told me (pardon the expression), "Merry Christmas" just about everyday for about two weeks. Similarly, I had wished her a (pardon the expression) "Happy" (pardon the expression) Hanakkuh."

Perhaps I was not (pardon the expression) enlightened enough to feel (pardon the expression) dirty about wishing a (pardon the expression) religious person a (pardon the expression) joyful time on an important (pardon the expression) observance.

Apparently, this (pardon the expression) woman (or should I spell that now as "womun") was (pardon the expression) educated in the same (pardon the expression) educational system that has (pardon the expression) produced a population of High School (pardon the expression) graduates (--how insensitive of me to distinguish such persons from non-graduates; I will begin sensitivity training in the --pardon the expression--New Year [after all it is not new for everyone]) where 23% of those enlisting for the (pardon the expression) military cannot (pardon the expression) pass a (pardon the expression) basic aptitude test.

This puts a whole new meaning on the phrase (pardon the expression) apologizing for (pardon the expression) Christ, when in ancient times the word (pardon the expression) apology (pardon the expression) meant (because "means" is such a definitive word) to (pardon the expression) confess one's (pardon the expression) faith in (pardon the expression) Jesus Christ.

But in (pardon the expression) my estimation, if one is not willing to (pardon the expression) confess Christ openly without having to (pardon the expression) pardon the expression, (pardon the expression) one (for some of us may have multiple personalities) is not (pardon the expression) worthy (pardon the expression) of Christ. That would make one "anti-Christ." And there should be no pardon for that.

Loudovikos on Communion and Otherness by John Zizioulas: Dictated Error

2010-12-21T13:23:00.001-06:00

Introduction

Nicholas Loudovikos is somewhat premature to refer to a ‘final theological position’ in the work of John Zizioulas in a likewise premature critique of the latter’s understanding of personhood in Orthodox Christian thought (‘Personhood instead of Grace and Dictated Otherness: John Zizioulas’ Final Theological Position,’ The Heythrop Journal, XLVIII [2009], pp. 1-16). Of course, it may be admitted that Zizioulas’ theological vision has been rather consistent for decades and is unlikely to change. Yet ‘final’ should not be applied to this creative thinker’s position as he actively continues his work. Likewise, by no means should Loudovikos, a creative and important voice of the ‘younger’ generation of Greek Orthodox theologians, have the final word on interpreting Zizioulas, especially when his interpretation requires a very select, limited reading of an author who has articulated his position through the media of numerous articles over the course of four decades.

Zizioulas has been challenged on numerous occasions, by members of the elder generation of Greek theologians, and now by the younger generation as well. At least in some cases, one may discern discomfort with Zizioulas’ general engagement with ‘western’ Christian and philosophical thought which necessitates a new application of ‘traditional’ terminology. Yet Zizioulas, like Christos Yannaras, is also often criticizing the lingering ‘western captivity’ of his own Greek elders and contemporaries, and this can only provoke a backlash! Nonetheless, the level of criticism he has attracted is only a testament to his influence and the high level of admiration he commands.

Loudovikos is very different in his challenge, as he is both a former student of Zizioulas and intimately engaged with ‘western’ thought, especially in its post-modernist expressions. Loudovikos ‘focuses’ on Zizioulas’ Communion and Otherness (T&T Clark, 2006), a compilation of papers brought together by the author explicitly to complement a similar publication appearing nearly two decades ago (Being As Communion). Indeed, in the opening chapter, Zizioulas attempts, in part, to evaluate the presumptions of postmodernism, and this becomes the core content to which Loudovikos responds.

Like Maximus the Confessor whom both these authors recognize as a chief authority of the tradition they interpret, Zizioulas has never offered a comprehensive, ‘systematically’ elaborate defense of his theological vision, and this despite his being a professor of systematic theology.[i] In his preferred medium, his relatively brief articles indicate an attempt to address an immediate need or question in the ongoing theological dialogue of the ecumenical environment, as well as the real, practical dialogues in which he participates as a representative (and now hierarch) of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. While particular articles certainly are straightforward and rather linear in their argument (though there are exceptions, even in Communion and Otherness), Andrew Louth’s characterization of Maximus is also true of Zizioulas: his writing ‘gathers together a collection of considerations that are gradually made to converge.’[ii]

The lack of considerable defense and development of his thought has left Zizioulas open to charges of misappropriating his ancient sources. In some cases, Zizioulas has—in this writer’s estimation—adequately defended his positions (as two such defenses appear in Communion and Otherness as appendixes to articles). In other cases, it is apparent that Zizioulas has, indeed, read his sources in a manner that would seem to defy a more obvious explanation, though there is perhaps a connection to the source cited that is not at all obvious. Nonetheless, Loudovikos not only examines Zizioulas’ use of sources but also, explicitly, his ideas. One must also presume that, reliant on sources or not, Zizioulas’ ideas are judged by Loudovikos in relation to the Orthodox Christian tradition to which, he states, he is responsible. It is precisely in his understanding of Zizioulas’ ideas that Loudovikos fails.

1. Nature, Person and Grace

Because of Zizioulas fondness for references to artistic enterprise, we might suggest that Loudovikos has concentrated only on the brushstrokes of a particular color, thereby missing the larger picture. Oblivious to other shades and strokes, his description of the picture on the canvas is rather distorted. This is especially true in relation to his understanding of Zizioulas’ concepts of ‘nature’ (Greek: physis), person (prosopon) and grace (charis). Other concepts subject to critique by Loudovikos are no less important, overall, in Zizioulas’ vision—such as ekstasis—but will receive less attention here.

Almost stunning is Loudovikos’ characterization of Zizioulas’ understanding of personhood as not only a ‘liberation of the person from nature…’, but as an ‘escape from nature.’[iii] While the former characterization could, perhaps, be interpreted in such manner to be consistent with what Zizioulas has to say on the matter, the former is clearly a view that Zizioulas—along with every Orthodox Christian theologian—must clearly reject, if not denounce as purely heretical. In both collections of his essays, Zizioulas is more than clear that ‘nature’ simply refers to the ‘what’ of something, that which distinguishes it from something else by definition. Zizioulas tends to associate, with good reason, the concept of the ‘person’ with hypostasis and, importantly, the tropos hyparxeos (‘mode of existence’) which is a category used extensively by the Cappadocians and Maximus the Confessor.[iv] The mode of existence, according to Zizioulas does not ‘define’ nature, but rather describes its real manifestation: the ‘how’ it exists. So the hypostasis or ‘person’ in Zizioulas can never ‘escape’ nature, for this would render it unreal and without any content, without ‘definition.’ Thus, no matter what the ‘condition’ or mode of its existence might be, the human person/hypostasis can never ‘escape’ human nature, for in so doing would cease being human at all. Indeed, Loudovikos basically affirms this point himself while pretending that Zizioulas has not made this point at several places in the one volume under discussion (Communion and Otherness) if not also in Being as Communion.

In fact, Loudovikos, in attempting to ‘interrogate’ his teacher’s position, argues in favor of Zizioulas’ position despite himself. In admitting that Maximus claims that the human will can be contrary to nature, then ‘nature does indeed become a burden of blind necessity.’[v] Of course, when Zizioulas discusses nature qua nature in its fallen state (i.e. ‘against nature’), Loudovikos is on the verge of mocking: ‘Nature…finally swallows poor humans up.’[vi] However, Loudovikos does credit Zizioulas for finding this understanding of nature (as intrinsically mortal apart from the sustaining power of the Creator, or, in Loudovikos’ preferred way of stating it, apart from grace) in the writings of Athanasius the Great. When Zizioulas reacts against the necessity of nature, he does so precisely to indicate that the person, hypostasizing nature (thus, making it really manifest), is more than the limitations (defined qualities and attributes) of nature per se. Nonetheless, Zizioulas is quick to affirm in both his major volumes that there is no reality to a ‘naked’ nature, a nature without hypostasis.

One thing that Loudovikos almost gets correct is his noting that Zizioulas strongly identifies the concept of person with grace: ‘This means either that we do not have a person unless we have this transcendent connection, or that we always have such a connection whenever we have a person—in both cases person is just another name for grace.’[vii] Almost correct, but not quite. In fact, Zizioulas affirms in both Being as Communion and Communion and Otherness that his notion of person is drawn not from the experience of human personhood, but from divine personhood. Personhood of the divine hypostases is the model, not the ‘personality’ and individual human being. Zizioulas makes this quite explicit; human beings aspire to authentic personhood according to the divine model. No wonder then, that Zizioulas ‘never explicitly asserts that this detached person, as well as nature as a whole, needs to be saved by grace.’[viii] Zizioulas, by Loudovikos’ own admission, has said that a human individual cannot truly be a person apart from communion with Christ. What other grace can there be in an Orthodox Christian understanding?

Indeed, in the effort, perhaps to distinguish his own thought from that of Zizioulas, Loudovikos splits hairs where completely unnecessary, even to the point of intellectual dishonesty. Zizioulas nowhere asserts that the human being, in becoming person, must be liberated or escape from nature, but rather from the determinism of nature which, in its fallen state is rather obvious. This explains Zizioulas’ several references to the fact that human nature now precedes human beings, not to mention his insistence on the fact that death—the fate of nature apart from grace!—is that from which human beings are ultimately saved. This is rather standard Orthodox Christian doctrine, though certainly cast into a new light. Yet it is simply dishonest to confuse or equate divine personhood and human personhood in the thought of Zizioulas; he makes it abundantly clear that this should not be done.

Other areas where Loudovikos tends to misread or misstate Zizioulas is in the former’s seeming identification of person (human person?) with the idea of personality, something to which Zizioulas strongly objects. When Zizioulas discusses the concept of the person, this is not identified necessarily with the idea of the ‘self,’ or the ‘I’ (ego) as Loudovikos often suggests. Again, the two ideas are related but distinct. After all, each and every human being can make reference to their ‘self,’ but not every human being has attained the fullness of personhood.

Likewise, for Loudovikos, it is pretty clear that there is an identification, perhaps under the influence of postmodern psychology with which he often engages, of desire and the will. This, again, is a most serious error, for the natural will and desire are not identical, any more than the natural will is identical with the ‘gnomic’ will, the latter arising due to ignorance and the need for deliberation (and therefore explicitly denied in the person of Christ by Maximus). The gnomic will is characteristic of fallen humanity and, perhaps, redeemed humanity but seems destined, once harmony between the divine will and human will is accomplished, to disappear. Another confusion of categories by Loudovikos is his treatment of desire. Zizioulas rarely discusses desire (Greek: epithymia) which is normally ascribed as a power of the soul by patristic sources, but instead does spend a great deal of attention on the ‘yearning’ of the person, the eros of ecstatic love.

Conclusion

One of the more important achievements of Loudovikos’ article is to demonstrate how easy it is to misunderstand Zizioulas and his theological project. But on this, there is an important note. As a pastor in a parish, Zizioulas is rather incomprehensible to the casual reader or untrained parishioner, but his engagement with important ideas are relatively easy to translate. He is not overly impressed by postmodernism (whatever that may mean today) but rather in one chapter of Communion and Otherness he discusses similarities but also divergences with this form of thought primarily through the writings of one philosopher (Levinas; who also receives attention in the notes of Being as Communion). Nonetheless, his ecclesiological and ‘personalist’ concepts are easily incorporated into a pastoral and liturgical theology of some use to pastors and the Church at large. Loudovikos may seek to impress his fellow academicians, but his work is largely void of applicability. Tearing down is quite different than edifying—the building up of the body, and it is precisely the edification that Zizioulas brings to the contemporary Church that has won him the highest esteem.

There are legitimate grounds to question some of Zizioulas’ positions, but mostly in articulating those areas where he has not produced any extensive comment. So instead of charging him with crypto-Arianism, crypto-monophysitism, crypto-monothelitism and even Gnosticism as Loudovikos does to impress his audience, it would have been far more productive for Loudovikos to stick to where his strengths in the article seem to be—in the psychological implications for the contemporary human condition in regard to the concept of divine personhood as described by his senior. For in the end, it is apparent that for almost every objection on the matter, his assertions to the contrary are actually consistent with Zizioulas’ vision.

[i] We can set aside for the moment the publication of Zizioulas’ dissertation in which the ideas that Loudovikos criticizes are not prevalent, even if several may be traced to this writing.

[ii] Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor, The Early Church Fathers (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 94.

[iii] Loudovikos, Person instead of Grace, 3. The characterization of ‘liberation of person from nature’ actually follows the more objectionable characterization, ‘escape from nature’ that appears several more times.

[iv] It may be noted that Zizioulas is aware that ‘person’ may not, in fact, be the meaning of hypostasis in some context, but it certainly corresponds to the person in divine and human existence.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Ibid.

Don't Ask, Don't Tell Revisted

2010-12-20T16:21:00.000-06:00

From some feedback on my prior post, it is probably necessary to state some explicit points regarding the Church's position on "Don't ask, don't tell."
     First, there is no formal position on the matter concerning the US military and the repeal of the policy by Congress. Is the also a matter of "don't ask, don't tell"? No. The position of the Church--of the Church, and not of those who claim membership in the Church--on homosexual orientation is rather clear, even if not formulated in a very good manner. Orthodox military chaplains (perhaps in contrast to some fundamentalist Christian chaplains) should have no issue with gays and lesbians serving openly in the military, any more than they have a problem with any other personnel with whom their worldview may differ.
     Second, I make a distinction between the Church and those who claim membership in the Church because there are a lot of persons who identify themselves as Orthodox Christians but are either, a) not Orthodox in faith and action, and, b) perhap not even really Christians. Likewise, there are also probably many sincere Orthodox Christians who struggle with the issue of sexual orientation as it is treated in our culture and society. Either they struggle with their own sexual orientation and desires (whatever those may be) or their lives are impacted somehow by other persons they love and care for who struggle with issues pertaining to sexual orientation.
     Third, awhile back, I read an interview with perhaps the pre-eminent Orthodox theologian of our era, Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) of Pergamon. In that interview, which focused on Orthodox Christian perspectives of matters before the Lambeth Conference of the Anglican Communion, Metropolitan John had occasion to comment on homosexuality as a phenomenon in Christian traditions. There the interviewer writes, "When I raise the question of homosexuality he claims that the Greek Church is traditionally flexible and non-judgemental on such issues, but is now becoming more puritanical - due to Western influence." (Theo Hobson, "An eye for the other," The Tablet: The international Catholic weekly, n.d. http://www.thetablet.co.uk/article/10248).
     This is a most important statement, and one that many Orthodox might shy away from almost instinctively. However, the words need to be carefully considered, because the answer (as formulated by the interviewer) is rather subtle. What does it mean to be "flexible" on the subject of homosexuality? What does it mean to be "non-judgemental" or "puritanical"? What about "western influence"?
     The last question is almost the easier one to answer when it comes to the subject of homosexuality. If one notices in my previous posting, I constantly refer to persons with a "homosexual orientation." I do also refer to gays and lesbians. But there is a distinction, for not all persons who are sexually attracted to persons of the same sex identify themselves as gay or lesbian. Likewise, though in the cultural west we typically use "homosexual" as a noun ("He/she is a homosexual") rather than an adjective, the whole subject of sexual attraction (orientation) is far more complex. In our language and in our thinking, we like to categorize and compartmentalize, when often doing so is erroneous or, at best, imprecise. Some persons in our society do identify themselves as gay or lesbian, but it is certainly not for me to label such persons.
     Western European Christian culture tends to be more a bit more moralistic than other cultures (excepting many Muslim cultures), and typically Americans have been strongly influenced by the Puritan founders of the nation. Not only were they moralistic (perhaps to the extreme), but also judgemental. In contrast to any public beach in the Mediterranean from Spain to Greece, it is unlikely you will see any nudity on public beaches in the US, unless someone is violating the law (sexual modesty is enshrined in our law!). Americans typically--as a group--tend to have more sexual "hang-ups" (including body issues and with nudity) than many other cultures where what we call nudity is just a necessity or normative (think National Geographic). Puritanism, when it comes to sexual differentiation, segregation and orientation, is certainly an enduring legacy within the U.S. I'm not saying this is necessarily a bad thing, but it can lead to judgmentalism which, in the Orthodox Christian tradition, is a bad thing (distinguished from discretion and discernment, which are good things).
     So when Metropolitan John notes that we tend to be judgemental about homosexuality, it is likely that the judgementalism to which he refers is precisely the condemnation of homosexuality and persons of that orientation. This is where a number of Christians err, for they do not always make the proper distinction between one's sexual orientation and one's behavior. This, perhaps, has something to do with the "flexibility" to which Metropolitan John apparently refers.
     It is clear that homosexual behavior is contrary to the values of the Church, as is a wide range of heterosexual behavior. This is far from a denunciation of persons of a homosexual or heterosexual orientation. If persons are condemned for their actions, there would probably have to be far more condemnations for inappropriate heterosexual behavior than homosexual behavior since there are far more persons in any large society with a predominantly heterosexual orientation. Strictly speaking, even marriage between a man and woman is not "license" for any heterosexual behavior by such a man and woman; there may be inappropriate and unhealthy sexual behaviors within (and, of course, outside of their) marriage. Yet many Christian moralists can calmly drive down the highway past billboards for "adult" entertainment venues geared toward "straight" prospective customers without calling for marches and protests, all the while blamiing homosexuals (among others, perhaps) for many of the problems of our increasingly immoral or amoral society. That is an absurdity.
     What Metropolitan John knows, as should all Orthodox Christians, is that we live in a fallen world. Everything we are born with--our physical and spiritual being, our social contexts--are touched by the corruption of the ancestral, primordial Fall. Nature, however defined, is fallen and in need of redemption in Christ. That process has begun, certainly, but that process is also not completed (in time, or history). We look for the completion of this process in the day of our Lord's coming.
     Our life in the Church is balanced by an acute need for the redemption of our personalized nature, bearing the marks of corruption in so many ways ("Lord have mercy is a constant refrain of CHristians, meaning they recognize the need for rescue/salvation), as well as an acute sense of grace in our salvation in the communion of Christ. Certainly, our baptism removes ("remits") the necessity of sin, but it does not mechanistically remove the temptation to sin or its lingering consquences in our world, our physical bodies, and our souls.
     Sin comes in a wide variety of forms, and we make a serious mistake to think of sin in purely ethical, moral or legalistic ways. Sin is not simply the violation of a commandment, but a condition of being "off the mark." If looked upon in this way, the "flexibility" of the Church in its confrontation with sin and sinners is a bit more understandable and compassionate, and should never be simply moralistic.
     Applied to sexual orientation, we must recognize that the labels "heterosexual" and "homosexual" are of relatively recent origin, and sin affects our orientation no matter what it is. We know that the sexual "impulse" is now, at best, only known in a form that has been altered from the original, primordial design of the Creator. In this sense, all sexual behavior is thus different than how it was supposed to be. That does not mean evil. Sexual desire and behavior have their proper context, and in the Orthodox Church we would state this context is a loving marital relationship. Not all persons are called to be in such a relationship, even as not all are called to remain unmarried. Our vocation in Christ is a personal matter of profound importance, and it is no secret that in our society most marriages fail (hence a need to qualify with "loving").
     One of the "western" influences of our contemporary society is the suggestion--explicit or implicit--that we cannot be healthy, fully-well-adjusted persons without an outlet for sexual impulses whatever these may be. We have generally bought into the suggestion that there is no difference between love and sexual behavior (in fact, a pop-star of the 80's had a neon sign, "love=sex," in a video), and that love "justifies" sexual behavior. Sexual continence has been determined to be not only unnecessary, but indicative of mental imbalance due to the "repression" of completely "natural" drives. The person who chooses to be sexually inactive is obviously not well-adjusted.
     How well-adjusted can our society be when there are beauty pageants for pre-pubescent girls, preparing them for the sexual objectification they will in fact promote when they model swimsuits as teens and young adults? How well-adjusted is our attitude toward sexual behavior when the pornography industry is as big, if not bigger, than Hollywood?
     It is a common axiom that Christians should hate the sin but love the sinner. That might be true (in some contexts, or perhaps ideally). But then how is it right to label any persons based upon their sexual orientation alone? In such a case, we do identify the act with the person, so that the sin and the sinner are one and the same. This is the inflexibility that Metropolitan John apparently suggests has infected our culture.
     Of course, the Church does not look upon homosexual orientation as in any sense "normal," but also there are many expressions of heterosexual orientation that do not rise to the standard of "normal," including among persons who are married. Though perhaps an abused word in our society, normal would be that which is consistent with the will of God and pleasing to him. Sin is that which separates us from God and the life he intends for us. So who is normal (i.e., without sin) all the time? Why would we presuppose that sexual sins are of greater weight than non-sexual sins? (Ever notice that adultery and covetousness--the acts of persons with a heterosexual orientation--make the top 10 commandments, but the "abominable" acts we label as homosexual are relegated to the fine points of the Mosaic law (and without any specific label applied to an entire class of persons)? Why are the sexual sins more worthy of condemnation in our society? That is an important question, because the true answer is that they are not.
     Indeed, we may be capable of objectively measuring the impact of sin on our society (from a human perspective). If (and it remains debatable) ten percent of the population consists of persons who may be sexually attracted to persons of the same sex, at most they can account for only ten percent of the sin that impacts society, unless we are under the mistaken belief that most persons convicted of violent crime (arguably sins that have the greatest social impact) are persons of a homosexual orientation. Of course, violent crimes are likely not to be the sins with the most severe impact on our society, for it is the vast accumulation, insidious as it may be, of "lesser" and even "private" sins that bind us.
     The Lord commissions the Church to go out to all peoples, not just those like us (by whatever standard we use). He prescribes a teaching us to observe His commandments (and nowhere does the Lord command us to not have so-called natural impulses or desires, only to control them). And nowhere in the Gospel do I recall Jesus approaching a sinner and "asking" about the sin, dwelling on it, focussing on it. Even Zacchaeus: the Lord simply asked to stay at his house that day. The woman caught in adultery: "go and sin no more." He came to save sinners--each and every one of us, no exceptions.

Logical Consistency: Don't Ask, Don't tell.

2010-12-19T14:57:00.002-06:00

When it comes to logical consistency, the US Senate and Executive Branch have a strict, don't ask, don't tell policy. Don't ask: don't ask anything about the underlying premise of permitting persons to "display or discuss" openly their homsosexual orientation in the military, other than to note that treating anyone differently on the basis of their sexual orientation is simply inconsistent with the United States Constitution as it has been (recently) interpreted. Don't tell: don't tell anyone that in contrast to the several operational and procedural changes necessary to permit women from serving in combat or forward-deployed areas, the integration of openly gay and lesbian service members into the force will not entail any operational or procedural changes.
     What were the changes instituted for women? Mainly, restrooms and quarters segregated from male service members. Logically, military leaders felt that, due to the majority of men and women being heterosexual, and due to our social custom of segregating men and women in "public" places when naked or partially-naked, there would be discomfort among the ranks if women were quartered with men. Now on base or at station, this was not a major problem. But on a naval vessel it posed more of a challenge. Still, the segregation of the sexes was undertaken and is maintained--though not without problems. Women are still harrassed, verbally and sexually assaulted and otherwise abused. Sure--illegal as it should be, but many of these incidents continue despite the fact that women have been serving in or alongside the military for many years. (Only more recently have women entered combat zones on land, sea and air.)
     Now logical consistency would suggest that somehow, the integration of openly gay and lesbian service members would require, like women, some adjustment by the military departments. The Pentagon, of course, has already announced that if they must integrate openly gay and lesbian service members, there will be no "segregation" protocols for them: like separate restrooms or living quarters. Males, regardless of sexual orientation, will continue to occupy their quarters; women, likewise. Of course, this raises the whole issue of why we should segregate the sexes in the first place: because of sexual attraction. The majority of males are sexually attracted to females and vice versa. Sexual modesty, still relatively prevalent in our society, leads most to desire some measure of "privacy" and freedom from the "risk" of sexual objectification when in the restroom, or changing clothes in one's living quarters.
     So, if the Pentagon were to be logically consistent, they would announce that from now on, all service personnel would be treated equally and identically, since sexual orientation (and its attendant sexual attraction to [some] persons of the same gender) is no longer a criteria that the armed forces are permitted to use in their treatement, housiing, training and caring for personnel. In fact, the Pentagon will reap benefits if this solution to the problem is adopted, for separate facilities for de-segregating the genders will save space and money! The only area I can think of where segregating the sexes would be necessary would be in medical treatment, for obvious reasons (male service members rarely get pregnant). And if good enough for the military, why would't such a unisex policy be adopted in all federal (and eventually state, county and municipal) government areas open to the public (I know for a fact that the Lincoln Monument has gender-specific restrooms). Eventually, we can adopt such a practice throughout society in all businesses, clubs and organizations (but not Churches, due to the strict separation of Church and State--see, it is a theological issue!).
     Or...We can adopt the recommendations of Fausto-Sterling (look her up if the reference is unknown) and other like-minded persons and adopt a four-gender approach, males and females being subdivided according to sexual orientation. Each of the four genders could have their own quarters and restrooms. (Fausto-Sterling, a professed lesbian, argues that this would be logically consistent though she rejects some of the premises of the argument.) This would cost more, but it's not like anyone in the government really cares about costs. Such an approach would be logically consistent, if not burdernsome.
     Of course, they will not do this. The objection from the gay and lesbian community would be too loud. And they will object that it's not like evey gay man walks into a restroom and sexually desires every other male in the place (the same goes for lesbians). True. I presume the same would occur in the instance if a heterosexual male were to enter a female restroom as well. But we have to ask: what it is that led to the segregation of restrooms in public spaces in the first place? The sexual orientation of the majority. Modesty in this regard has, until now, prevailed.
   In fact, now that I think about it, a great injustice in our society has been perpetuated against all our sisters, gay and straight alike! After all, the segregated restrooms leads to long lines (in length and duration) at many female restrooms at public events. Open up the other restroom to them, and their civil right (someone will be able to identify this in our Constitution) to be able to use the restroom in a timely, convenient fashion can be implemented. In fact, I should call for a constitutional convention to ensure such a civil right (which should, of course, be prioritized above speeach and other guaranteed freedoms since needing to use the facilities is often far more important to me than the freedom to speak. And we should change that other founding document as well, changing the word "equal" to "identical." That would result in a lot of logical consistency in this society!
     Of course, few have considered the military issue as one of sexual modesty and privacy, except the (real) injustice of an honorable service member being dis-honorably discharged only due to his or her sexual orientation. But then again, why would we expect the officials we elect in today's climate to think about such things? Don't ask! Certainly, don't tell!

Entering the Fray...

2010-12-17T20:53:00.001-06:00

This is the first entry for my new blog, formerly on the Saint Demetrios (Hammond, IN) parish website. The reason for this blog is that the Parish website really needs to be about the Parish, not about my thoughts.

Mostly this blog will concern itself with theological issues--that is, theological in the very broadest sense, for as the "mother of all sciences," theology is concerned with every facet of our experience, from the boring to the profound. But as this is my blog, I will mostly be commenting on those aspects of church experience that concern me as a clergyman, as a pastor, as a husband and dad, and as a citizen of my commuity and nation. Every now and then, I will also comment on my current "theological" reading list with reviews and reactions. But no gossip or personal attacks...

And as we approach the Lord's Nativity and the Festival of Lights, may you have a very, merry Christmas!